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A model in mathematic logic is called pseudo-ﬁnite, in case it satisﬁes only such sentences of ﬁrst-
order predicate logic that have a ﬁnite model. Its main part modelled based on Jouko
Väänänen's article "Pseudo-ﬁnite model theory", this text studies classic model theory restricted
to pseudo-ﬁnite models. We provide a range of classic results expressed in pseudo-ﬁnite terms,
while showing that a set of other well-known theorems fail when restricted to the pseudo-ﬁnite,
unless modiﬁed substantially. The main ﬁnding remains that a major portion of the classic theory,
including Compactness Theorem, Craig Interpolation Theorem and Lidström Theorem, holds in
an analogical form in the pseudo-ﬁnite theory.
The thesis begins by introducing the basic ﬁrst-order model theory with the restriction to relational
formulas. This purely technically motivated limitation doesn't exclude any substantial results or
methods of the ﬁrst-order theory, but it simpliﬁels many of the proofs. The introduction behind,
the text moves on to present all the classic results that will later on be studied in terms of the
pseudo-ﬁnite. To enable and ease this, we also provide some powerful tools, such as Ehrenfeucht-
Fraïssé games.
In the main part of the thesis we deﬁne pseudo-ﬁniteness accurately and build a pseudo-ﬁnite
model theory. We begin from easily adaptable results such as Compactness and Löwenheim-Skolem
Theorems and move on to trickier ones, exampliﬁed by Craig Interpolation and Beth Deﬁnability.
The section culminates to a Lidström Theorem, which is easy to formulate but hard to prove in
pseudo-ﬁnite terms.
The ﬁnal chapter has two independent sections. The ﬁrst one studies the requirements of a sentence
for having a a ﬁnite model, illustrates a construction of a ﬁnite model for a sentece that has one,
and culminates into an exact ﬁnite model existence theorem. In the second one we deﬁne a class
of models with a certain, island-like strucure. We prove that the elements of this class are always
pseudo-ﬁnite, and at the very end the text, we present a few examples of this class.
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1 Introduction
This text is about the theory of models which satisfy only ﬁrst-order sentences that have
a ﬁnite model. We call these models pseudo-ﬁnite. After some basics in relational ﬁrst-
order model theory, we will show that many of the classic results in the subject can be
formulated in terms of pseudo-ﬁnite models, primarily following [1]. We also look into
what is required from a sentence to be true only in ﬁnite models and provide a class of
models that are always pseudo-ﬁnite.
3
2 First-order model theory
2.1 First-order logic
In this section we provide the basic deﬁnitions of relational ﬁrst-order logic.
Deﬁnition 2.1. An alphabet L is any set of constant, relation and function symbols, such
that each relation symbol R and each function symbol f have an arity, #R,#f ∈ N \ {0}.
When not mentioned otherwise, we let L = {Ri, fj , ck|i ∈ I, j ∈ J, k ∈ K} be a
ﬁxed but arbitrary alphabet. So whenever we refer to e.g. a function symbol f without
specifying an alphabet, then by default, f = fj ∈ L for some j ∈ L.
Deﬁnition 2.2. L-terms are deﬁned as follows:
(i) Variable symbols vi, i ∈ N, are L-terms
(iii) Constant symbols ci ∈ L are L-terms
(iv) If f ∈ L is a function symbol, n = #f and t1 . . . , tn are L-terms, then f(t1 . . . , tn)
is an L-term.
Deﬁnition 2.3. L-atomic formulas are deﬁned as follows:
(i) If t and u are L-terms, then t = u is an L-atomic formula
(ii) If R ∈ L is a relation symbol, #R = n and t1 . . . , tn are L-terms, then R(t1 . . . , tn)
is an L-atomic formula.
Deﬁnition 2.4. L-formulas are deﬁned as follows:
(i) L-atomic formulas are L-formulas
(iii) if φ is an L-formula, then ¬φ is an L-formula called the negation of φ
(iv if φ and ψ are L-formulas, then (φ∧ψ) is an L-formula called the conjunction of φ
and ψ
(v) if φ is an L-formula and i ∈ N, then ∃viφ is an L-formula. We say φ is a kvantiﬁed
formula and call ∃ the existential quantiﬁer.
These formulas are also called the ﬁrst-order formulas. We will often refer to symbols,
terms and formulas without specifying an alphabet they belong to, but we then assume
they are L-symbols, L-terms and L-formulas for the ﬁxed but arbitrary alphabet L noted
earlier.
If there is no risk of confusion, we write φ ∧ ψ rather than (φ ∧ ψ). The following
notations will be used:
φ ∨ ψ := ¬(¬φ ∧ ¬ψ)
φ→ ψ := ¬φ ∨ ψ
φ↔ ψ := (φ→ ψ) ∧ (ψ → φ)
∀viφ := ¬∃vi¬φ
We call ∀ the universial quantiﬁer.
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Throughout the text, we shall use ” := ” when deﬁning notations to highlight what is
the new notation and what is its deﬁnition; if we write ϕ := ψ or ψ =: ϕ, we mean that ϕ
is a notation for ψ.
We shall drop the brackets from (φ∧ψ), in case there is no essential risk of confusion.
Also, we use letters x, y, z and their abbreviations to denote arbitrary variable symbols.
Further, we sometimes use the notation φ ∧ ψ such that φ is a formula but ψ is either
a formula or the empty set. In the latter case, we deﬁne φ ∧ ψ := ψ.
For a larger list of formulas, φ1 . . . , φn, we use the notation
∧
i∈{1,...,n} φi when we mean
φ1 ∧ . . . ∧ φn, and
∨
i∈{1,...,n} φi when we mean φ1 ∨ . . . ∨ φn.
Deﬁnition 2.5. Given a variable symbol vi and a formula φ, we deﬁne the notion "vi is
free in φ" as follows:
(i) φ is atomic: vi is free in φ, if vi appears in φ
(ii) φ = ¬ψ for some formula ψ: vi is free in φ, if it is free in ψ
(iii) φ = ψ ∧ θ for some formulas ψ and θ: vi is free in φ, if it is free in ψ or in θ
(iv) φ = ∃vjψ for some formula ψ: vi is free in φ, if it is free in ψ and i 6= j.
If vi was free in φ, then we say that ∃vi bounds vi in ∃viφ. Further, if vi is not free in
φ, then we say that vi is bounded in φ.
Deﬁnition 2.6. By sentence we mean a formula in which no variable symbol is free. By
theory we mean a class of sentences, and if T is a theory all the sentences in which are
L-sentences, then we say that T is an L-theory.
Unless otherwise stated, when presenting a list of variable symbols by a list mutually
distinct of symbols that have no ﬁxed deﬁnition, we assume that each of the latter symbols
depicher a unique variable symbol. Thus, if we use x = (x1, . . . , xn) to represent a list
of ﬁxed but arbitrary variable symbols, we suppose that when i 6= j, xi and xj represent
diﬀerent variable symbols. By xi = xj we mean that the variable symbols xi and xj
represent are the same, and by xi 6= xj we respectively mean that xi and xj represent
distinct variable symbols. Further, instead of stating that "let x = (x1, . . . , xn) represent
a list of ﬁxed but arbitrary variable symbols" we usually just say "let x = (x1, . . . , xn) be
variables" or "let x = (x1, . . . , xn)".
Now if x = (x1, . . . , xn) are variables and φ a formula, then by φ(x) and φ(x1, . . . , xn)
we mean that x1, . . . , xn are presicely the free variable symbols of φ. In addition, given
a variable y and variable sequences z = (z1, . . . , zk), z
∗ = (zk+1, . . . , zn), 1 ≤ k ≤ n,
by φ(x1, . . . , xm−1, y, xm+1, . . . , xn) we mean the formula obtained from φ(x1, . . . , xn) by
replacing xm with y, and by φ(z, z
∗) we mean the formula obtained from φ(x1, . . . , xn) by
replacing x1, . . . , xk with z1, . . . , zk and xk+1, . . . , xn with zk+1, . . . , zn.
Deﬁnition 2.7. A model is a sequence
M = (M, (RMi )i∈I , (fMj )j∈J , (cMk )k∈K),
where
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(i) M is a non-empty set, called the domain of the model M and donated also by
dom(M). This set is in addition called the universe ofM. When there is no risk of con-
fusion, we shall donate the universums of modelsM,N ,A,B, . . . asM,N,A,B, . . . without
writing out thatM = (M, (RMi )i∈I , (fMj )j∈J , (cMk )k∈K),N = (N, (RNi )i∈I , (fNj )j∈J , (cNk )k∈K)
and so on). The elements of the domain of a model are called the elements or the points
of the model.
(ii) RMi ⊆M#R
(iii) fMj : M
#R →M
(iv) cMk ∈M
for all i ∈ I, j ∈ J , k ∈ K.
The RMi , f
M
j and c
M
k are called the interpretations of Ri, fj and ck. If all the symbols
Ri, fj and ck belong to an alphabet L, then we sayM is an L-model.
Deﬁnition 2.8. LetM be an L-model. Then
s : L ∪ {vi : i ∈ N} 7→M ∪
⋃
{cMi : i ∈ I} ∪
⋃
{fMj : j ∈ J} ∪
⋃
{RMk : k ∈ K}
is an interpretation function inM, if
(i) s(vi) ∈M for all variable symbols vi, i ∈ N
(ii) s(ci) = c
M
i for all i ∈ I
(iii) s(fj) = f
M
j for all j ∈ J
(iv) s(Rk) = R
M
k for all k ∈ K.
If s is an interpretation function and a ∈ M , i ∈ N, then by s(i/a) we mean the
interpretation formula that is otherwise indentical to s but s(vi) = a.
If f is an n-ary L-function symbol, then by s(f(x1, . . . , xn)) we mean s(f)(s(x1), . . . , s(xn)).
Thus we have deﬁned the notion s(t) for any term.
Deﬁnition 2.9. The Tarski Truth Deﬁnition
Suppose φ(x1, . . . , xn) is an L-formula,M is an L-model, a = (a1, . . . , an) ∈ Mn and
s is such an interpretation function that s(xi) = ai for all i ∈ {i, . . . , n}. Then we deﬁne
M |=s φ as follows:
(i) φ is t = u: M |=s φ iﬀ s(t) = s(u)
(ii) φ = Rk(t1, . . . , tm): M |=s φ iﬀ (s(t1), . . . , s(tm) ∈ RMi
(iii) φ = ¬ψ: M |=s φ iﬀM 6|=s ψ
(iv) φ = ψ(x) ∧ θ(x): M |=s φ iﬀM |=s ψ andM |=s θ
(v) φ = ∃viψ(x, vi): M |=s φ iﬀ for some a ∈M ,M |=s(i/a) ψ.
IfM |=s φ, then we say φ is true inM under the interpretation s.
Remark 2.10. Suppose M is an L-model, φ(x1, . . . , xn) is an L-formula and s and s′
are interpretation functions in M such that s′  {x1, . . . , xn} = s  {x1, . . . , xn}. Then
M |=′s φ if and only ifM |=s φ.
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By remark 1.10 we can make a few simpliﬁcations in our notation and terminology.
Suppose the assumptions of the remark hold, and suppose a ∈ Mn and s(xi) = ai for
all i ∈ {i, . . . , n}. In this case we shall normally use the notation M |= φ(a1, . . . , an), or
shortly, M |= φ(a), when we mean M |=s φ. (We in fact do not assume that x1, . . . , xn
are free in φ when writingM |= φ(a1, . . . , an), even though we do make that assumption
when notating φ(x1, . . . , xn).) Further, if ϕ is an L-sentence, thenM |=s ϕ either for all
or for no interpretation fuction s, so we may simply notateM |= ϕ.
If φ is a sentence andM |= φ, then we say that φ is true inM and thatM satisﬁes φ,
and also that φ has a model. For a theory T , byM |= T we mean thatM |= φ for every
φ ∈ T . IfM |= T , we sayM satisﬁes T .
For an alphabet L, let Str(L) denote the class of all L-models and Fo(L) the class of
all L-sentences. Then the triple Lω,ω = (Str(L), Fo(L), |=), where |=⊆ Str(L)× Fo(L) is
the truth relation deﬁned above, is called the relational ﬁrst-order logic. For the sake of
simplicity, we shall refer to it as simply the ﬁrst order logic from here on.
Deﬁnition 2.11. For a formula φ and for terms t and u, ψ(t/u) is ψ with every appearence
of the term t replaced by u.
Deﬁnition 2.12. Suppose T is an L-theory and φ an L-formula. Then by
T ` φ
we mean that for any L-modelM and interpretation function s,M |= T impliesM |=s φ.
If T = ∅ and all L-models and their interpretation functions satisfy φ, we write
` φ.
Deﬁnition 2.13. If φ and ψ are formulas and ` φ ↔ ψ, then we say that φ and ψ are
equivalent and that φ is equivalent to ψ.
Deﬁnition 2.14. An L-theory T is
(i) consistent if there is a modelM such thatM |= T (i.e. T has a model). Otherwise
T is inconsistent.
(ii) complete if for every L-sentence φ, T ` φ or T ` ¬φ.
Deﬁnition 2.15. (i) Let M and N be L-models. If dom(N ) ⊆ dom(M), RNi = RMi ∩
dom(N ), fNj ⊆ fMj and cNk = cMk for all i ∈ I, j ∈ J, k ∈ K, then we say that N is a
submodel ofM and write N ⊆M.
(ii) For A ⊆M ,
M  A = (A, (cMi )i∈I , (fMj  A)j∈J , (RMk  A)k∈K),
which by deﬁnition 2.7 is a model if fNj (a) ∈ A for all a ∈ A, i ∈ I. Similarly, if ∅ 6= τ ⊆ L,
then
M  τ = (M, (cMi )i∈{i:ci∈τ}, (fMj )j∈{j:fj∈τ}, (RMk )k∈{k:Rk∈τ}),
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which always is a model by deﬁnition 2.7, and
M  (A, τ) = (A, (cMi )i∈{i:ci∈τ}, (fMj  A)j∈{j:fj∈τ}, (RMk  A)k∈{k:Rk∈τ}),
which is a model if fNj (a) ∈ A for all a ∈ A, j ∈ {j : fj ∈ τ}.
Deﬁnition 2.16. (i) An atomic formula φ is relational if it is of one of the following forms:
R(x1, . . . , xn), f(x1, . . . , xn) = y, y = f(x1, . . . , xn), ci = x or x = ci.
(ii) Relational atomic formulas are relational formulas.
(iii) If φ and ψ are relational formulas, then also ¬φ, φ ∧ ψ and ∃φ are relational.
Deﬁnition 2.17. (i) Let t be a term. The relationality rank of t, rr(t), is deﬁned as
follows: If t = vi then rr(t) = 0, if t = ci then rr(t) = 1, and if t = f(u1, . . . , un) then
rr(t) = 1 +max{rr(u1), . . . , rr(un)}.
(ii) Suppose φ is an atomic formula. Its relationality rank rr(φ) is deﬁned as follows:
If φ = R(t1, . . . , tn), then rr(φ) = max{rr(t1), . . . , rr(tn)}, and if φ = t = u, then
rr(φ) = rr(t) + rr(u)− 1.
We remark that an atomic formula φ is relational, if and only if rr(φ) ≤ 0.
Lemma 2.18. For any atomic formula φ(x), x = (x1, . . . , xn) there is a relational formula
ψ(x) equivalent to φ(x).
Proof. By induction on rr(φ). If rr(φ) ≤ 0, φ(x) is relational itself. Suppose rr(φ) =
p + 1. We show the claim for φ = R(t1, . . . , tn); ci = cj , f(t1, . . . , tn) = u and u =
f(t1, . . . , tn) satisfy the claim by an analoguous argument. Now φ is equivalent with
ψ∗ := ∃y1, . . . ,∃y1(R(y1, . . . , yn) ∧
∧
1≤i≤n yi = ti), where rr(yi = ti) ≤ p for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n
and hence by the induction assumtion, there are relational formulas θi equivalent to yi = ti
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Thus ψ∗ along with φ are equivalent to a relational formula.
Lemma 2.19. For any formula φ(x), x = (x1, . . . , xn) there is a relational formula ψ(x)
equivalent to φ(x).
Proof. By induction on φ. For an atomic φ the claim follows from lemma 2.18. If φ = ¬φ
or φ = ψ ∧ θ, the claim follows trivially from the induction assumtion. If φ = ∃xψ, then
by the induction assumption, ψ is equivalent to a relational θ. Thus ` φ ↔ ∃xθ, where
∃xθ is relational.
By lemma 2.19, we can make the following restriction: From here on, we assume the
logic used, Lω,ω, is relational, i.e. whenever referring to a formula, we assume the formula
is relational.
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Deﬁnition 2.20. The quantiﬁer rank qr(φ) of a formula φ is deﬁned as follows:
(i) φ is atomic: qr(φ) = 0
(ii) qr(¬ψ) = qr(ψ)
(iii) qr(ψ ∧ θ) = max{qr(ψ), qr(θ)}
(iv) qr(∃xψ) = qr(ψ) + 1.
If qr(φ) = 0 we say that φ is unquantiﬁed.
Lemma 2.21. Suppose L is ﬁnite. Then for all k, n ∈ N there is a ﬁnite set F kn of
L-formulas of quantiﬁer rank ≤ k such that
(i) if φ ∈ F kn , then no other variables than v0, . . . , vn appear free in φ
(ii) for any L-formula ψ, qr(ψ) ≤ k, in which no other variables than v0, . . . , vn appear
free, there is an equivalent formula φ such that φ ∈ F kn .
Proof. By induction on k ∈ N.
k = 0: Let θ1, . . . , θn list all the atomic L-formulas in which no other variables than
v0, . . . , vn appear. Let Φn be the ﬁnite set of the formulas
∧
i∈X θi ∧
∧
i∈Y ¬θi for any
X,Y ⊆ {1, . . . , n}. Then let ψi, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, enumerate Φn and deﬁne
F 0n =
{ ∨
i∈X
ψi : X ⊆ {1, . . . , n}
}
.
Since for any formulas φ and ψ, ¬¬φ and φ ∧ φ are equivalent to φ and ¬(φ ∧ ψ) is
equivalent to ¬φ ∨ ¬ψ, any unquantiﬁed formula θ can be equivalently expressed in the
form σ :=
∨{∧1≤i≤k φk}, where every φk is an atomic or a negated atomic formula. Now
by the deﬁnition of the sets F 0n , there is n ∈ N such that σ ∈ F 0n .
k = p+ 1: Deﬁne
Ψkn = F
p
n ∪ {∃vn+1φ,¬∃vn+1φ : φ ∈ F pn+1}.
Let θi, 1 ≤ i ≤ k, list the formulas of Ψkn and let Φkn be the ﬁnite set of the formulas∧
i∈X θi for any X ⊆ {1, . . . , k}. Then let ψi, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, enumerate Φkn and deﬁne
F kn = Fn ∩
{ ∨
i∈Y
ψi : Y ⊆ {1, . . . ,m}
}
,
where Fn is the set of L-formulas that no other variables than v0, . . . , vn appear free
in. Again, for any formulas φ and ψ, ¬¬φ and φ ∧ φ are equivalent to φ and ¬(φ ∧ ψ)
is equivalent to ¬φ ∨ ¬ψ, so any formula θ, qr(θ) ≤ k, in which no other variables than
v0, . . . , vn appear free, can be equivalently expressed in the form σ :=
∨{∧1≤i≤k φk}, where
every φk either is an element of F
p
n , or φ = {∃vikψ(vi1 , . . . , vik),¬∃vikψ(vi1 , . . . , vik)},
where ik > ij for all j < k and ψ ∈ F pn . Hence by the deﬁnition of the sets F kn , σ ∈ F kn .
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2.2 On partial isomorphisms and their applications
Deﬁnition 2.22. (i) Suppose A and B are models, X ⊆ A and f : X → B. Then f is
a partial isomorphism from A to B if for all atomic formulas φ(x1, . . . , xn) and a ∈ Xn,
A |= φ(a) if and only if B |= φ(f(a)).
(ii) If f : A → B is a partial isomorphism and A = B, then f is a partial automorphism.
(iii) If X = A, then f is an isomorphism, and if A = B, then f is an automorphism.
(iv) If there exists an isomorphism between A and B, we say that A and B are isomor-
phic.
Accurately, a partial isomorphism f from A to B is a function f : dom(A)→ dom(B).
However, we use the notation f : X → B, X ⊆ dom(A) to highlight that f is a partial
isomorphism in relation to models A and B.
Deﬁnition 2.23. Suppose U ∈ L is an unary relation symbol and ψ(x, z), (x, z) =
(x1, . . . , xn, z1, . . . , zm), and θ are L-formulas, such that none of the variable symbols
x1, . . . , xn, zm appear in θ. Let A be an L-model and let b ∈ A. Then formulas θ(U) and
θ(ψ(b,z)) are deﬁned as follows:
(i) θ is atomic: θ(U), θ(ψ(b,z)) = θ
(ii) θ = ¬φ: θ(U) = ¬φ(U), θ(ψ(b,z)) = ¬φ(ψ(b,z))
(iii) θ = φ ∧ ϕ: θ(U) = φ(U) ∧ ϕ(U), θ(ψ(b,z)) = φ(ψ(b,z)) ∧ ϕ(ψ(b,z))
(iv) θ = ∃yφ: θ(U) = ∃y(U(y) ∧ φ(U)) and θ(ψ(b,z)) = ∃y(ψ((b, y)) ∧ φ(ψ(b,z)))
If z is a single variable symbol and there is no risk of confusion, we mark θ(ψ(b,z)) =:
θ(ψ(b)) and A  ψA(b, z) =: A  ψA(b).
Lemma 2.24. Suppose U ∈ L is an unary relation symbol and ψ(x, z), x = (x1, . . . , xn),
and θ(y), y = (y1, . . . , yk), are L-formulas. Let A be an L-model and b ∈ An such that
A  UA and A  ψA(b, z) are submodels of A. Then for all a ∈ (UA)k, A |= θ(U)(a) if
and only if A  UA |= θ(a), and for all a ∈ (ψA(b, z))k, A |= θ(ψ(b))(a) if and only if
A  ψA(b) |= θ(a).
Proof. By induction on ψ. A |= θU (a) is a special case of A |= θ(ψ(b))(a), so it suﬃces to
prove that A |= θ(ψ(b))(a) if and only if A  ψA(b) |= θ(a).
(i) θ is atomic: A |= θ(ψ(b))(a) iﬀ A |= θ(a) iﬀ A  ψA(b) |= θ(a) since
A  ψA(z, b) is a submodel of A and a ∈ (ψA(z, b))k.
(ii) θ = ¬φ: A |= θ(ψ(b))(a) iﬀA 6|= φ(ψ(b))(a) iﬀA  ψA(b) |= φ(a) iﬀA  ψA(b) |= θ(a).
(iii) θ = φ∧ϕ: A |= θ(ψ(b))(a) iﬀA |= φ(ψ(b))(a) andA |= ϕ(ψ(b))(a) iﬀA  ψA(b) |= φ(a)
and A  ψA(b) |= ϕ(a) iﬀ A  ψA(b) |= θ(a).
(iv) θ = ∃yφ, y 6= z: A |= θ(ψ(b,z))(a) iﬀ there is c ∈ A such that A |= ψ(b, c) ∧
φ(ψ(b,z))(a, c) iﬀ there is c ∈ ψA(b, z) such that A |= φ(ψ(b,z))(a, c) iﬀ there is c ∈ ψA(b, z)
such that A  ψA(b) |= φ(a, c) iﬀ A  ψA(b) |= θ(a).
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Deﬁnition 2.25. Suppose A ⊆ B are L-models. Then we write
(i) A  B if for all L-formulas ψ(x1, . . . , xn) and all a ∈ An, A |= ψ(a) if and only if
B |= ψ(a)
(ii) A k B if for all L-formulas ψ(x1, . . . , xn) with qr(ψ) ≤ k and for all a ∈ An,
A |= ψ(a) if and only if B |= ψ(a)
(iii) A ≡ B if A and B satisfy precisely the same L-sentences; in this case we say that
A and B are elementary equivalent
(iv) A ≡k B if for all L-sentences ψ with qr(ψ) ≤ k, A |= ψ if and only if B |= ψ
Lemma 2.26. Tarski-Vaught for formulas with a limited quantiﬁer rank.
A k B if A ⊆ B and for all formulas ψ(x1, . . . , xn, y) with qr(ψ) < k and for all
a ∈ An the following holds: if B |= ∃yψ(a, y), then there is b ∈ A such that B |= ψ(a, b).
Proof. Suppose k ∈ N. Let us prove by induction on the structure of an L-formula
ϕ(z1, . . . , zn) that if qr(ϕ) ≤ k and b ∈ An, then A |= ϕ(b), if and only if B |= ϕ(b).
1) ϕ is atomic: Directly from the assumption A ⊆ B.
2) ϕ = ¬ψ or ϕ = ψ ∧ θ: Considering that qr(ψ), qr(θ) ≤ qr(ϕ), the induction claim
follows from the induction assumption.
3) ϕ = ∃yiψ: Two directions:
"⇒": If A |= ϕ(b), then there is c ∈ A such that A |= ψ(b, c). Since qr(ψ) ≤ k, the
induction assumption yields B |= ψ(b, c), in which case B |= ϕ(b).
"⇐": If B |= ϕ(b), then the assumption provides c ∈ A such that B |= ψ(a, b). Since
qr(ψ) ≤ k, the induction assumption yields A |= ψ(a, b), so A |= ϕ(b).
Corollary 2.27. A k B if A ⊆ B and there is k ∈ N \ {0} such that for all formulas
ψ(x, y), (x, y) = (x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , yk), with qr(ψ) < k and for all a ∈ An the following
holds: if B |= ∃y1 . . . ∃ykψ(a, y1, . . . , yk), then there is b ∈ Ak such that B |= ψ(a, b).
Proof. Suppose A ⊆ B and ψ(x1, . . . , xn, y) is an L-formula with qr(ψ) < k. Suppose
a ∈ An and B |= ∃yψ(a, y). Then B |= ∃y1 . . . ∃ykφ(a, y1, . . . , yk), where
φ = ψ ∧
∧
0≤i≤k
yi = yi.
Now there is b = (b1, . . . , bn) ∈ Ak such that B |= φ(a, b), which implies B |= ψ(a, b1).
Thus lemma 2.26 yields A k B.
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Deﬁnition 2.28. Similiar to [2, deﬁnition 7.6].
Suppose A and B are L-models, a ∈ An, b ∈ Bn and A ∩B = ∅.
(i) An Ehrenfeucht-Fraïssé game of lenght k ∈ N, denoted by EFk((A, a), (B, b)), is a
game played by two players, I and II. For k ≥ 1, each round 1 ≤ m < k begins by player
I choosing cm ∈ A ∪ B, which is followed by player II choosing a partial isomorphism
fm : A → B such that cm ∈ dom(fm) ∪ rng(fm) and fm  dom(fm−1) = fm−1, where
f0 = {(ai, bi) : 1 ≤ i ≤ n, (a1, . . . , an) = a, (b1, . . . , bn) = b}. For any k ∈ N, player II wins
the game if every fm, m ≤ k, is a partial isomorphism; otherwise I wins the game.
(ii) A function sequence (gi)1≤i≤k is a strategy for player II in EFk((A, a), (B, b)), if for
all 1 ≤ i ≤ k, gi is a function from (A∪B)i to the partial maps A→ B. We call (gi)1≤i<k
a winning strategy for player II, if II always wins the game by choosing gi(c0, . . . , ci) on
each round i ≤ k.
(iii) If a winning strategy for player II exists, then we say II wins EFk((A, a), (B, b))
and mark II ↑ EFk((A, a), (B, b)).
(iv) For a = b = ∅, we deﬁne EFk((A, a), (B, b)) exactly as above except that f0 = ∅.
If a = b = ∅, we notate EFk((A, a), (B, b)) := EFk(A,B).
We shall often use the abridgment "EF game" when referring to an Ehrenfeucht-Fraïssé
game.
Theorem 2.29. [2, theorem 7.8.]
Suppose L is ﬁnite, k ∈ N, a ∈ An and b ∈ Bn. Then the following are equivalent:
(i) II ↑ EFk((A, a), (B, b))
(ii) For all L-formulas φ(x), x = (x1, . . . , xn), of quantiﬁer rank ≤ k, A |= φ(a) if and
only if B |= φ(b).
Proof. As in [2].
(i)⇒(ii): By induction on k.
(1) k = 0: The deﬁnitions of an EF game and the quantiﬁer rank imply directly that
for all atomic L-formulas φ(x), x = (x1, . . . , xn), A |= φ(a) if and only if B |= φ(b). Thus
a trivial induction yields that (ii) holds.
(2) k = p+ 1: By induction on φ:
(2.a) φ is atomic: By (1).
(2.b) φ = ¬ψ or φ = ψ ∧ θ: Directly by the induction assumption.
(2.c) φ(x) = ∃xψ(y, x): Now qr(φ) = qr(ψ) + 1 by the deﬁnition of the quantiﬁer rank
(deﬁnition 2.20), so qr(ψ) = p. Suppose A |= φ(a). Then there is c ∈ A such that A |=
ψ(a, c). Now suppose player I chooses c on the round 1. Since II ↑ EFk((A, a), (B, b)),
there is d ∈ B such that II ↑ EFp((A, (a, b)), (B, (b, d))). The induction assumtion yields
then that A |= ψ(a, c) if and only if B |= ψ(b, d). Thus we may conclude B |= ψ(b, d),
which implies B |= φ(b). On the other hand, symmetry yields that if B |= φ(b), then
A |= φ(a).
(ii) ⇒(i): As follows, we deﬁne formula sets Φkn for every k, n ∈ N, and prove by a
simultaneous induction that that each Φkn is ﬁnite and consists of formulas with quantiﬁer
rank k and no other variables displayed than v0, . . . , vn.
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k = 0, n ∈ N: Let θ1, . . . , θn list, up to equivalence, all the unquantiﬁed L-formulas
in which no other variables than v0, . . . , vn appear (such a ﬁnite list exists by lemma
2.21). Let Φ0n be the ﬁnite set of the formulas
∧
i∈X θi ∧
∧
i∈Y ¬θi for any X ⊆ {1, . . . , n},
Y = {1, . . . , n} \X.
k = p + 1, n ∈ N: By the induction assumtion Φpn+1 is ﬁnite. We enumerate the set
Φpn+1 as θi(x, vn+1), 1 ≤ i ≤ m. Let Φkn be the set of the formulas
ψY (x) =
∧
i∈Y
∃vn+1θi(x, vn+1) ∧ ∀vn+1
∨
i∈Y
θi(x, vn+1)
for any non-empty Y ⊆ {1, . . . ,m}. We note that Φkn is clearly ﬁnite and following the
application of induction assumtion to Φpn+1, consists of formulas with quantiﬁer rank k
and no other variables displayed than v0, . . . , vn.
Now it clearly suﬃces to prove the following claim.
Claim 1. Suppose k ∈ N, a ∈ An and b ∈ Bn. Then
(a) there is ψ(x) ∈ Φkn such that A |= φ(a)
(b) provided ψ(x) ∈ Φkn andA |= ψ(a) holds iﬀ B |= ψ(b) holds, then II ↑ EFk((A, a), (B, b)).
We prove claim 1 by induction on k.
k = 0: Clear.
k = p + 1: Let Φpn+1 = {θi(x, vn+1) : 1 ≤ i ≤ m} and deﬁne Y = {i ∈ N : A |=
∃vn+1θi(a, vn+1)}. By the induction assumption, Y 6= 0 and thus ψY (x) ∈ Φkn. In addition
A |= ψY (a). This covers (a).
As for (b), there is ψ(x)Y ∈ Φkn such that A |= φ(a) by (a). Suppose A |= ψY (a)
holds iﬀ B |= ψY (b) holds. We describe a winning strategy for II. Let c0 ∈ A ∪ B
be the ﬁrst move of I. We can assume c0 ∈ A as the other case is symmetric. Now
A |= ψY (a) implies that there is i ∈ Y such that A |= θi(a, c0). Since B |= ψY (b), the
structure of ψY yields B |= ∃vn+1θi(b, vn+1), so there is d ∈ B such that B |= θi(b, d).
Now θi ∈ Φpn+1 and A |= θi(a, c0) holds iﬀ B |= θi(b, d) holds, so the induction assumption
yields II ↑ EFk((A, a, c0), (B, b, d)), which means that II has a winning strategy for the
rest of the game.  Claim 1.
Theorem 2.30. From [8].
Let n ∈ N and L = {<}, where < is a binary relation symbol. Suppose A and B are
ﬁnite linear orders of cardinality ≥ 2n − 1. Then A ≡n B.
Proof. The claim is trivial for n = 0, so we may assume n ≥ 1.
Any ﬁnite L-model C that is well-ordered by <C is isomorphic to some N (k) =
({1, . . . , k}, <), where (p, q) ∈<N (k) if and only if p < q (as in "p is a smaller number
than q"). Therefore we may assume A = N (k) and B = N (k′) for some k, k′ ≥ 2n− 1. In
addition, theorem 2.29 implies it is enough to show II ↑ EFn(A,B).
13
Now suppose 1 ≤ m ≤ n and (a1, . . . , am) ∈ Am, (b1, . . . , bm) ∈ Bm and a1 ≤ . . . ≤ am.
Then we say that f = {(ai, bi) : 1 ≤ i ≤ m} has the interval quality if the following holds:
b1 ≤ . . . ≤ bm and for any 2 ≤ j ≤ m− 1, the intervals [ai, ai+1] and [bi, bi+1] are mutually
either of the same length or both are ≥ 2n−m, and the same holds for [0, a1] and [0, b1] as
well as [am, k + 1] and [bm, k
′ + 1].
A function f : X → B, X ⊆ dom(A), is a partial isomorphism if and only if f is a
bijection and preserves the order <, i.e. for all p, q ∈ dom(f), p < q iﬀ f(p) < f(q).
Therefore, if II is able to follow a strategy (gi)1≤i≤n such that for any 1 ≤ m ≤ n and
a ∈ Am, gm(a) has the interval quality, then II clearly wins the game. Hence it suﬃces
to show the following:
Claim 1. There is a strategy (gi)1≤i≤n for player II such that gm(a) has the interval
quality for any 1 ≤ m ≤ n and a ∈ Am.
Proof of claim 1: We construct (gi)1≤i≤n recursively and simultaneously prove claim 1
by induction on 1 ≤ m ≤ n.
(1) m = 1: By symmetry we may assume I chooses a1 ∈ A. If k − a1 ≤ 2n−1 − 1,
player II chooses b1 = k
′− a1, and otherwise II chooses b1 = a1. Function gm(a1) clearly
has the interval quality.
(2) m = p + 1: By symmetry we may assume I chooses am+1 ∈ A, and that it falls
in the interval [c, d], where c = ai, d = ai+1 for some 1 ≤ i < m, or c = 0 and d = a1, or
d = k + 1 and c = am. Let [c
′, d′] be the corresponding interval in B.
Case 1: d− am+1 < 2n−m−1. Based on the induction assumption, by choosing bm+1 =
d′−(d−am+1) player II ensures [c, am+1] and [c′, bm+1], as well as [am+1, d] and [bm+1, d′],
have the same lenghts.
Case 2: am+1 − c < 2n−m−1. Symmetric to case 1.
Case 3: d − am+1 ≥ 2n−m−1 and am+1 − c ≥ 2n−m−1. Now d − c ≥ 2n−m, so the
induction assumption yields d′− c′ ≥ 2n−m. Therefore player II is able to choose bm+1 so
that d′ − bm+1 ≥ 2n−m−1 and bm+1 − c′ ≥ 2n−m−1.
Hence gm(a1, . . . , am) has the interval quality.  Claim 1.
Theorem 2.30 yields the following as an immediate consequence:
Corollary 2.31. Let L = {<}, where < is a binary relation symbol. Then there is no
such L-sentence θ that given a ﬁnite, well-ordered L-modelM,M |= θ if and only if |M|
is even.
Deﬁnition 2.32. From [1], page 10.
Suppose A is an L-model, P ∈ L is a binary relation, R,S ∈ L are unary relation
symbols, LR := L \ {c ∈ L : cA /∈ RA}, LS := L \ {c ∈ L : cA /∈ SA} and R,S are
L-models, such that R  LR = A  (RA, LR) and S  LS = A  (SA, LS). A PA-ranked
back-and-forth system in alphabet L betweenR and S is a sequence (Ij)j∈PA of non-empty
sets of partial isomorphisms, such that
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(i) if j ∈ dom(PA) ∪ rng(PA) and f ∈ Ij , then f : U → R for some U ⊆ SA, or
f : V → S for some V ⊆ RA
(ii) if PA(k, j), then for every a ∈ RA there is b ∈ SA such that f ∪ {(a, b)} ∈ Ik, and
for every b ∈ SA there is a ∈ RA such that f ∪ {(a, b)} ∈ Ik.
Theorem 2.33. Suppose A is a countable L-model and (Ij)j∈PA is a PA-ranked back-and-
forth system in alphabet L between R and S. If PA has an inﬁnite descending sequence,
then R and S are isomorphic.
Proof. We begin by enumerating the sets dom(R) and dom(S) as dom(R) = {ai : i ∈ N}
and dom(S) = {bi : i ∈ N}. Let {(jk+1, jk) : k ∈ N} ⊆ PA be an inﬁnite descending
sequence. Let us construct a rising chain of partial isomorphisms f0 ⊆ f1 ⊆ . . . as follows:
(i) f0 = ∅
(ii) For an even k ∈ N, fk+1 = fk ∪ ai 7→ bj , where i = min{i ∈ N : ai /∈ dom(fk)},
and j ∈ N, provided by the back-and-forth system, is such that fk+1 ∈ Ijk+1 .
(iii) For an uneven k ∈ N, fk+1 = fi ∪ ai 7→ bj , where j = min{j ∈ N : bj /∈ rng(fk)},
and i ∈ N, provided by the back-and-forth system, is such that fk+1 ∈ Ijk+1 .
Then
⋃
k∈N fk : R → S is an isomorphism.
Theorem 2.34. Suppose L is ﬁnite and A is an L-model. Suppose also that
(1) R,S ∈ L, q ∈ N, q ≥ 1, LR := L \ {c ∈ L : cA /∈ RA}, LS := L \ {c ∈ L : cA /∈ SA}
(2) L-models R and S are such that R ≡q S, R  LR = A  (RA, LR) and S  LS =
A  (SA, LS)
(3) PA = {(p0, p1), . . . , (pq−1, pq)} ⊆ A2.
Then there is a PA-ranked back-and-forth system in alphabet L between S and R such
that PA is a linear order in A but |PA| = q.
Proof. First we note that deﬁned as above, PA is a linear order and |PA| = q.
Since R ≡q S, theorem 2.29 yields that II ↑ EFq(R,S). Let (gi)1≤i≤q,
gi : (R
A ∪ SA)i → {f : X → S|X ⊆ RA}
for each 1 ≤ i ≤ q, be a winning strategy for player II. We deﬁne sequence (Ipk)pk∈PA
such that Ip0 = ∅ and for all 1 ≤ k ≤ q,
Ipk = {gk(a1, . . . , ak) : (a1, . . . , ak) ∈ (RA ∪ SA)k}.
We show by induction that for any 0 ≤ k ≤ q, (Ipk)pk∈PA is a PA-ranked back-and-forth
system in alphabet L between S and R.
(1) k = 0: Clear.
(2) k = n + 1: Since the assumtions regarding L, A, R and S match those at the
deﬁnition 2.32 of back-and-forth systems, it suﬃces to show that (i) any f ∈ Ipk is a
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partial isomorphism between R and S, and (ii) for any f ∈ Ipn , a ∈ RA, b ∈ SA there are
c ∈ SA, d ∈ RA such that f ∪ {(a, c)}, f ∪ {(b, d)} ∈ Ipk .
(2.i) Given any (a1, . . . , ak) ∈ (RA ∪ SA)k, gk(a1, . . . , ak) is a partial isomorphism
between R and S by the deﬁnition 2.28 (ii) of winning strategies of EF games.
(2.ii) Let f ∈ Ipn . Then by the deﬁnition of (Ipk)pk∈PA , there is (a1, . . . , an) ∈
(RA ∪ SA)n such that f = gn(a1, . . . , an). A partial isomorphism must be an injec-
tion as otherwise formula ¬v0 = v1 would create a contradiction with the deﬁnition of a
partial isomorphism; hence we may assume f−1 exists. Now if f is a partial isomorphism
Y → R, Y ⊆ SA, then f−1 is a partial isomorphism X → S, X ⊆ RA, so we may assume
f : X → S, X ⊆ RA. Suppose a ∈ RA and b ∈ SA. Then the deﬁnition of (Ipk)pk∈PA
yields h1 = gk(a1, . . . , an, a) ∈ Ipk and h2 = gk(a1, . . . , an, b) ∈ Ipk , where c := h1(a) ∈ SA,
d := h2(b) ∈ RA, and h1 = f ∪ {a, c} as well as h2 = f ∪ {(b, d)}.
Corollary 2.35. Suppose the assumtions of theorem 2.34 hold otherwise, but the following
takes place instead of (2):
Assume L-models R and S are such that R  LR = A  (RA, LR) and S  LS = A 
(SA, LS). Also suppose f : X → SA, X ⊆ RA, is a partial isomorphism, such that for all
formulas φ(x1, . . . , xn) of quantiﬁer rank ≤ q and for all a ∈ (dom(f))n, R |= φ(a) if and
only if S |= φ(f(a)).
Then there is a PA-ranked back-and-forth system (Ipk)pk∈PA in alphabet L between S
and R such that PA is linear, |PA| = q and f ∈ Ip0.
Proof. Let L∗ = L∪{a : a ∈ dom(f)}. We extend models A, R and S to L∗-models A∗, R∗
and S∗ by adding interpretations for {a : a ∈ dom(f)} the following way: aR∗ = aA∗ = a
and aS∗ = f(a). Now R∗ ≡q S∗ so we can apply theorem 2.34 and deduct that there is
a PA∗-ranked back-and-forth system (I∗pk)pk∈PA∗ in alphabet L
∗ between S and R such
that PA∗ is linear and |PA∗ | = q. Without loss of generality, we may assume every g ∈ I∗pk
is g : X → SA∗ for some X ⊆ RA∗ . Thus, if g ∈ I∗pk for any 0 ≤ k ≤ q, then g ∪ f
is a partial isomorphism by R∗ ≡q S∗. Let us deﬁne a new sequence (Ipk)pk∈PA so that
Ipk = {g ∪ f : g ∈ I∗pk} for all pk ∈ PA.
Claim 1. (Ipk)pk∈PA is a P
A-ranked back-and-forth system in alphabet L between S
and R such that PA is linear, |PA| = q and f ∈ Ip0 .
Proof of claim 1: By the assumptions of this lemma and the deﬁnion of (Ipk)pk∈PA ,
PA is linear, |PA| = q and f ∈ Ip0 . Hence, by the deﬁnition 2.32 of back-and-forth
systems, it suﬃces to show that (i) any h ∈ Ipk is a partial isomorphism between R
and S, and (ii) for any h ∈ Ipn , a ∈ RA, b ∈ SA there are c ∈ SA, d ∈ RA such that
h ∪ {(a, c)}, h ∪ {(b, d)} ∈ Ipk .
For (i), let 0 ≤ k ≤ q. Then every h ∈ Ipk is a partial isomorphism since it is of the
form g ∪ f for some g ∈ I∗pk , and any g ∪ f , g ∈ I∗pk , is a partial isomorphism between R
and S, as was noted above. To show (ii), suppose PA(n, k), h ∈ Ipn and a ∈ RA. Now
h is of the form g ∪ f for some g ∈ I∗pn , and (I∗pk)pk∈PA∗ being a back-and-forth system,
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there is b ∈ SA such that g ∪ {(a, b)} ∈ I∗pk . The deﬁnition of (Ipk)pk∈PA yields then
g ∪ f ∪ {(a, b)} = h ∪ {(a, b) ∈ Ipk . By symmetry, we may conclude that also for every
b ∈ SA there is a ∈ RA such that h ∪ {(a, b) ∈ Ipk . Hence (Ipk)pk∈PA is a PA-ranked
back-and-forth system in alphabet L between S and R.  Claim 1.
2.3 Classic results of ﬁrst-order model theory
Theorem 2.36. Compactness Theorem
If T is a ﬁrst-order theory every ﬁnite subset of which has a model, then T has a model.
Proof. See [2].
When referring to the Compactness Theorem, we mean the above formulation. How-
ever, there exists also an alternative, equivalent version:
Theorem 2.37. The Compactness Theorem is equivalent to the following: Let T be a
theory and φ a sentence such that T ` φ. Then there is a ﬁnite U ∈ T such that U ` φ.
Proof. ”⇒ ” Suppose that if T is a theory every ﬁnite subset of which has a model, then
T has a model. Let T be a theory and φ a sentence such that T ` φ. Then there are two
options.
(1) T is inconsistent: By assumption, there must now be a ﬁnite U ∈ T such that U is
inconsistent. Since U has no model, U ` ψ for any sentence ψ, so in particular U ` φ.
(2) T is consistent: Now theory T ∪ {¬φ} has no model, so by the assumption, there
is a ﬁnite U ⊆ T ∪ {¬φ} such that U has no model. Since T is consistent, so is any its
subset, so ¬φ ∈ U . Since U has no model, the sentence
θ :=
∨
{¬ψ : ψ ∈ U \ {¬φ}} ∨ φ
is true in any (L-) model. By notating U \{¬φ} = {ψ1, . . . , ψn} and by using the notation
deﬁned under deﬁnition 2.12, we observe that given a model A, A |= θ if and only if
A |= ψ1 → (ψ2 → (. . . ψn−1 → (ψn → φ) . . .).
Thus
` ψ1 → (ψ2 → (. . . ψn−1 → (ψn → φ) . . .),
so U \ {¬φ} ` φ, where U \ {¬φ} is ﬁnite.
⇐: Suppose that if T is a theory and φ a sentence such that T ` φ, then there is a
ﬁnite U ∈ T such that U ` φ. Let us assume now that T has no model and that φ is a
sentence. Then T ` φ ∧ ¬φ. By assumption there is a ﬁnite U ∈ T such that U ` φ ∧ ¬φ,
so U is inconsistent. Thus we establish that an inconsistent theory has an inconsistent
ﬁnite subtheory, which to equals to that if T is a theory every ﬁnite subset of which is
consistent, then T is consistent. Therefore, if T is a theory every ﬁnite subset of which
has a model, then T has a model.
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Theorem 2.38. (Downward) Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem
If T is a ﬁrst-order theory that has an inﬁnite model, then it has a countable model.
Proof. See [2].
Theorem 2.39. Robinson Consistency Theorem
Let Ti be a consistent Li theory, i ∈ {1, 2}. Suppose T1∩T2 is a complete L1∩L2-theory.
Then T1 ∪ T2 is consistent.
Proof. See [6].
We exceptionally prove the following theorem in standard, non-relational logic. Since
every sentence has an equivalent relational version, so does the interpolant of the below
theorem. Further, any sentence equivalent to the interpolant clearly works as an inter-
polant as well.
We also note that the proof of the theorem uses only deﬁnitions expressed prior to the
introduction of the restriction to relational logic, which took place after lemma 2.19. The
proof doesn't lean on any other prior results than the Compactness Theorem, which is
proven in non-relational logic in [2] and therefore can be used below (the relational version
of the Compactness Theorem is a trivial consequence of the non-relational one).
Theorem 2.40. The Graig Interpolation Theorem
Suppose L1 and L2 are countable. Let ϕ be an L1-sentence and σ an L2-sentence such
that ϕ→ σ. Then there is an L1 ∩L2 -sentence θ (the interpolant) such that ` ϕ→ θ and
` θ → σ.
Proof. Inspired by [3].
Suppose there is no such θ. Given any alphabets L∗1 and L∗2 and theories T1 in L∗1 and
T2 in L
∗
2, we say that T1 and T2 are separable if there is a L
∗
1 ∩ L∗2-sentence φ such that
T1 ` φ and T2 ` ¬φ. Otherwise, we say that T1 and T2 are inseparable.
Theories {ϕ} and {¬σ} are inseparable, since elsehow there was an L1 ∩L2-sentence θ
such that {ϕ} ` θ and {¬σ} ` ¬θ, in which case we had ϕ→ θ and θ → σ, meaning that
θ would work as an interpolant between ϕ and σ, which we assumed to be impossible.
We introduce a new countably inﬁnite set of constant symbols, C, where C∩(L1∪L2) =
∅. Let L′i = Li∪C, i ∈ {1, 2}, let (φi)i∈N be an enumeration of all L′1-sentences and (ψi)i∈N
of all L′2-sentences. Deﬁne T0 := {ϕ} and U0 := {¬σ}. If now p = n + 1 and Tn and Un
and inseparable, then either Tn ∪ {φn} and Un are inseparable, or Tn ∪ {¬φn} and Un are
inseparable, since otherwise Tn∪{φn} ` θ, Un ` ¬θ, Tn∪{¬φn} ` ξ and Un ` ¬ξ for some
L′1 ∩ L′2-sentences θ, ξ, meaning that Tn ` θ ∨ ξ and Un ` ¬θ ∨ ¬ξ, which contraditcs Tn
and Un being separable. We may symmetrically conclude that either Tn and Un ∪ {ψn}
are inseparable, or Tn and Un ∪ {¬ψn} are inseparable. Furthermore, if φn = ∃xξ(x) and
c ∈ C doesn't appear in the sentences of Tn, then for any sentence θ that uses no other
vocabulary than what appears on both Tn and Un, Tn ∪ {ξ(c)} ` θ implies Tn ` θ. Since
the equivalent holds for Un, we can deﬁne that
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(1) Tp = Tn ∪ {θ} ∪ X, where θ = φn if Tn ∪ {φn} is inseparatable and θ = ¬φn
otherwise, and X = ∅, if θ is not of the form ∃xξ(x), while otherwise, X = {ξ(c)} for
c ∈ C that doesn't appear in the sentences of Tn.
(2) Up = Un ∪ {θ} ∪ Y , where θ = ψn if Un ∪ {ψn} is inseparatable and θ = ¬ψn
otherwise, and Y = ∅, if θ is not of the form ∃xξ(x), while otherwise, Y = {ξ(c)} for c ∈ C
that doesn't appear in the sentences of Un.
Now Tω =
⋃
i∈N Ti and Uω =
⋃
i∈N Ui are complete, and also inseparable by the
compactness theorem. Also Tω ∩ Uω is complete, since if θ is an L′1 ∩ L′2-sentence, then
either θ ∈ Tω or ¬θ ∈ Tω and θ ∈ Uω or ¬θ ∈ Uω, and due to the inseparability of Tω and
Uω, either θ ∈ Tω and θ ∈ Uω, or ¬θ ∈ Tω and ¬θ ∈ Uω. Furthermore, both Tω and Uω
must be consistent since an inconsistent theory is separable from any theory.
We build an L′1-model M by using an abbreviated version of the so-called Henkin
construction. Deﬁne a new relation v in C as follows: c v d if and only if Tω ` c = d.
v is clearly an equivalence relation. Then let [c] be the equivalence class of c ∈ C under
v. Now Tω is complete and consistent, so for all relation symbols R ∈ L1 and function
symbols f ∈ L1, #R,#f = n, and for all ci v c′i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, Tω ` R(c1, . . . , cn) if and only
if Tω ` R(c′1, . . . , c′n) and Tω ` f(c1, . . . , cn) = f(c′1, . . . , c′n).
(*) Since Tω ∩ Uω is consistent, we may stricten the deﬁnition of v as c v d if and
only if Tω ∪ Uω ` c = d. Considering that C ∈ L′1 ∩ L′2, v remains identical under this
new deﬁnition. Furthermore, by the completeness and consistency of Uω, we see that for
all relation symbols R ∈ L1 ∪L2 and function symbols f ∈ L1 ∪L2, #R,#f = n, and for
all ci v c′i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, Tω ∪ Uω ` R(c1, . . . , cn) if and only if Tω ∪ Uω ` R(c′1, . . . , c′n) and
Tω ∪ Uω ` f(c1, . . . , cn) = f(c′1, . . . , c′n).
Thus we may consistently deﬁneM as follows:
dom(M) = {[c] : c ∈ C}
For d ∈ L′1 ∪ L′2, dM = [c] if d = c ∈ Tω ∪ Uω
For f ∈ L′1 ∪ L′2, #f = n, fM([c1], . . . , [cn]) = [f(c1, . . . , cn)]
For R ∈ L′1 ∪ L′2, #R = n, ([c1], . . . , [cn]) ∈ RM if R(c1, . . . , cn) ∈ Tω ∪ Uω
We prove for all L′1-sentences φ, that M |= φ if and only if φ ∈ Tω, by induction on
φ ∈ Tω.
φ is atomic:
(a) We show ﬁrst that for all L-terms t(x1, . . . , xn), t([c1], . . . , [cn])
M = [t(c1, . . . , cn)].
This follows directly from the deﬁnition for constant symbols, but suppose t = f(u1, . . . , um).
Then inductively t([c1], . . . , [cn])
M = fM(uM1 ([c1], . . . , [cn]), . . . , uMm ([c1], . . . , [cn]))
= fM([u1(c1, . . . , cn)], . . . , [um(c1, . . . , cn)]) = [f(u1(c1, . . . , cn), . . . , um(c1, . . . , cn))]
= [t(c1, . . . , cn)].
(b) φ = t = u: t = u ∈ Tω iﬀ t v u iﬀ [t] = [u] iﬀ tM = uM iﬀM |= t = u.
(c) φ = R(t1, . . . , tn): R(t1, . . . , tn) ∈ Tω iﬀ RM([t1], . . . , [tn]) iﬀ RM(tM1 , . . . , tMn ) iﬀ
M |= R(t1, . . . , tn).
φ = ¬ψ: Note that ¬φ ∈ Tω iﬀ φ /∈ Tω. By the induction assumtion, φ /∈ Tω iﬀM 6|= φ
iﬀM |= ¬φ.
φ = ψ ∧ θ: Directly by the induction assumption.
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φ = ∃xψ(x): φ ∈ Tω iﬀ ψ(c) ∈ Tω for some c ∈ C iﬀ, by the induction assumtion,
M |= ψ(c) for some c ∈ C, which takes place iﬀM |= φ.
By symmetric measures we can establish that for all L′2-sentences φ, M |= φ if and
only if φ ∈ Uω. Hence M |= Tω ∪ Uω, so in particular M |= ϕ ∧ ¬σ. This contraditcs
ϕ→ σ.
In the next theorem we use notation ϕ(R) for a sentence that displays relation symbol
R.
Theorem 2.41. Beth Deﬁnability Theorem
Suppose R,S /∈ L are new n-ary relation symbols and ϕ(R) an L ∪ {R}-sentence. Let
{ϕ(R), ϕ(S)} ` ∀x1, . . . ,∀xn(R(x1, . . . , xn)↔ S(x1, . . . , xn)).
Then there is an L-formula θ(x1, . . . , xn) such that
{ϕ(R)} ` ∀x1, . . . ,∀xn(R(x1, . . . , xn)↔ θ(x1, . . . , xn)).
Proof. The theorem is equivalent to the following formulation:
Claim 1. Suppose R,S /∈ L are new n-ary relation symbols, ϕ(R) an L∪{R}-sentence
and c = (c1, . . . , cn) /∈ L new constant symbols. Let
{ϕ(R), ϕ(S)} ` R(c)↔ S(c)).
Then there is an L-formula θ(x1, . . . , xn) such that
{ϕ(R)} ` (R(c)↔ θ(c)).
We prove claim 1.
The assumtion of claim 1 yeilds
{ϕ(R), ϕ(S), R(c)} ` S(c),
which implies
{ϕ(R), R(c)} ` ϕ(S)→ S(c),
so we establish that
` (ϕ(R) ∧R(c))→ (ϕ(S)→ S(c)).
By applying the Craig Interpolation Theorem we see that there is L ∪ {c}-sentence θ(c),
such that
` (ϕ(R) ∧R(c))→ θ(c) and ` θ(c)→ (ϕ(S)→ S(c)).
Thus
{ϕ(R)} ` R(c)→ θ(c) and {θ(c), ϕ(S)} ` S(c),
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so
{ϕ(R)} ` R(c)→ θ(c) and {ϕ(S)} ` θ(c)→ S(c).
Because R,S /∈ L, the right side yields
{ϕ(R)} ` θ(c)→ R(c).
Therefore
{ϕ(R)} ` R(c)↔ θ(c),
so claim 1 and with it the theorem are true.
Theorem 2.42. Morley's theorem.
Suppose L is countable and T is an L-theory such that for some uncountable cardinal
κ, T has, up to isomorphism, exactly one model of cardinality κ. Then T has, up to
isomorphism, precisely one model of every uncountable cardinality.
Proof. See [7].
3 Pseudo-ﬁnite model theory
3.1 Introduction
Deﬁnition 3.1. Let L be an alphabet in ﬁrst order logic. We call an L-modelM pseudo-
ﬁnite, in case all the L-sentences true inM are also true in a ﬁnite model.
Many of the fundamental results of ﬁrst-order model theory can be formulated in terms
of the pseudo-ﬁnite models, as we will see below. First, however, we look at a few basics
of the pseudo-ﬁnite model theory.
Deﬁnition 3.2. If L be an alphabet in ﬁrst-order logic, we deﬁne
ΓL = {ϕ ∈ L : ¬ϕ has no ﬁnite model}.
Lemma 3.3. From [2].
Let L be a ﬁrst-order alphabet andM an L-model. Then the following statements are
equivalent:
(1)M |= ΓL.
(2) Every ﬁrst-order sentence true inM is true in some ﬁnite model.
(3) There is a set {Mi : i ∈ I} of ﬁnite L-models and an ultraﬁlter F on I such that
M≡
∏
i∈I
Mi/F .
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Proof. (1)⇒(2): Assume M |= ΓL. If (2) doesn't hold, then there is a sentence ϕ such
that M |= ϕ but ϕ is true only in inﬁnite models. In that case ¬ϕ ∈ ΓL, so M |= ¬ϕ,
implying thatM 6|= ϕ, which is a contradiction.
(2)⇒(1): Assume every ﬁrst-order sentence true in M is true in some ﬁnite model. If
M 2 ΓL, then there is ϕ ∈ ΓL such thatM |= ¬ϕ. Now as per the deﬁnition of ΓL, ¬ϕ
holds only in inﬁnite models, which is a contradiction.
(3)⇒(2): Clear, as when (3) holds, every ϕ ∈ L true in M has a ﬁnite Mi for some
i ∈ I such thatMi |= ϕ.
(2)⇒(3): Suppose every ﬁrst-order sentence true in M is true in some ﬁnite model. Let
T = Thm{M} and let I be the set of ﬁnite subsets of T . For each i ∈ I, let Mi be a
ﬁnite L-model such thatMi |=
∧
i. Deﬁne
Xi = {j ∈ I :Mj |=
∧
i}.
Now {Xi : i ∈ I} has the ﬁnite intersection property: If i, j ∈ I, then i ∪ j ∈ I, and if
k ∈ I is such thatMk |=
∧
i ∪ j, thenMk |=
∧
i andMk |=
∧
j. Thus
Xi∪j ⊆ Xi ∩Xi.
Further, Xi 6= ∅ for all i ∈ I since Mi |=
∧
i, so {Xi : i ∈ I} can be expanded to an
ultraﬁlter F ⊂ P(I). Now ifM |= ϕ, then
{j ∈ I :Mj |= ϕ} = X{ϕ} ∈ I ⊂ F,
so ∏
i∈I
Mi/F |= ϕ.
By using theory ΓL we can easily prove "pseudo-ﬁnite" versions of many classic model-
theoretic results. In several of the cases we only need to use the fact that the pseudo-ﬁnite
models of an L-theory T are precisely the models of the theory T ∪ ΓL, and to apply the
classic result to theory T ∪ ΓL.
Deﬁnition 3.4. If T is a theory and ϕ a sentence, then by T `FIN ϕ we mean T ∪ΓL ` ϕ,
where L is precisely the combined alphabet of T and ϕ.
Having the above deﬁnition tied to the precise alphabet L of T and ϕ is essential. If
both L′ \ L∗ and L∗ \ L′ are non-empty, then for all ϕ ∈ ΓL′ \ ΓL∗ and ψ ∈ ΓL∗ \ ΓL′ ,
ϕ ∧ ψ ∈ ΓL′∪L∗ but
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ϕ ∧ ψ /∈ ΓL′ and
ϕ ∧ ψ /∈ ΓL∗ , so
ΓL′ ∪ ΓL∗ ( ΓL′∪L∗ .
3.2 Directly adaptable classic results
Compactness Theorem, Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem and Morley's Theorem can be stated
directly in terms of pseudo-ﬁnite models.
Theorem 3.5. Finite Compactness Theorem
If T is a ﬁrst-order theory every ﬁnite subset of which has a pseudo-ﬁnite model, then
T has a pseudo-ﬁnite model.
Proof. We apply the Compactness Theorem to theory T ∪ΓL: Suppose S ⊆ T is ﬁnite and
it has a pseudo-ﬁnite modelM. ThenM |= S ∪ S∗ for any ﬁnite S∗ ⊆ ΓL. Thus, if every
ﬁnite S ⊆ T has a pseudo-ﬁnite model, then every ﬁnite S ⊆ T ∪ ΓL has a model, which
by the Compactness Theorem means that T ∪ ΓL has a model N , and since N |= ΓL, N
is a pseudo-ﬁnite model of T .
When referring to the Finite Compactness Theorem we mean the above version. How-
ever, there exists an alternative formulation as in the case of the classic Compactness
Theorem.
Theorem 3.6. Finite Alternative Compactness Theorem
Let T be a theory and φ a sentence such that T `FIN φ. Then there is a ﬁnite U ⊆ T
such that U `FIN φ.
Proof. Let T be a theory and φ a sentence such that T ∪ ΓL ` φ. By the Compactness
Theorem and theorem 2.37, there is a ﬁnite S ⊆ T∪ΓL such that S ` φ. Deﬁne U := S\ΓL,
observing that U ⊆ T is also ﬁnite. Then U ∪ ΓL ` φ, meaning U `FIN φ.
Theorem 3.7. Finite Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem
If T is a countable ﬁrst-order theory and T has a pseudo-ﬁnite model, then T has a
pseudo-ﬁnite countable model.
Proof. Suppose T is a countable ﬁrst-order theory with a pseudo-ﬁnite model M. Then
M is a model for the theory T ∪ ΓL, so by the Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem, T ∪ ΓL has
a countable model N , and since N |= ΓL, N is a countable pseudo-ﬁnite model of T .
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Theorem 3.8. Finite Morley's Theorem
If a countable ﬁrst-order theory T has, up to isomorphism, exactly one pseudo-ﬁnite
model in some uncountable cardinality, then it has, up to isomorphism, precisely one
pseudo-ﬁnite model in every uncountable cardinality.
Proof. Suppose T is a countable L theory with, up to isomorphism, exactly one pseudo-
ﬁnite modelM in some uncountable cardinality κ. Then L, and consequently ΓL, consist-
ing of ﬁnite subsets of a countable set, must be countable, andM is the only one model
(up to isomorphism) that T ∪ΓL has on κ. Now by Morley's Theorem, T ∪ΓL has precisely
one model (up to isomorphism) in every uncountable cardinality, so T has precisely one
pseudo-ﬁnite model (up to isomorphism) in every uncountable cardinality.
3.3 Interpolation
For Craig Interpolation, Beth Deﬁnability and Robinson Consistency Theorems we are
unable to simply apply the classic theorems to the theory T ∪ ΓL and by that to obtain
pseudo-ﬁnite versions of the theorems. We will see this by counter examples. For the
one for Craig's theorem, we need the following lemma, which implies that no sentence of
empty volabulary can characterize any class of ﬁnite models such that the cardinalities of
the models in the class have no upper boundrary.
Lemma 3.9. Suppose L = ∅ and θ is an L-sentence with qr(θ) ≤ k. ThenM |= θ if and
only if N |= θ for any modelsM, N of any alphabet with |M |, |N | ≥ k.
Proof. Note that for all models A, A |= θ if and only if A  L |= θ. Therefore we may
assume thatM and N are models of the empty alphabet. By theorem 2.29 it suﬃces to
prove that player II has a winning strategy in any EFk(M,N ).
Now f : X → N , X ⊆ M , is a partial isomorphism if it is an injection, so II can
clearly win by a strategy (gi)1≤i≤k that satisﬁes the following:
i = 1: If I chooses c1 ∈ M then II chooses any c1 7→ d1, d1 ∈ N , and if I chooses
c1 ∈ N then II chooses any d1 7→ c1, d1 ∈M .
i = n + 1 ≤ k: Suppose fn is the partial isomorphism X → N , X ⊆ M , developed
by the previous rounds. Let cn+1 ∈ M ∪ N be the choice of I on round n + 1. If
cn+1 ∈ dom(fn)∪ rng(fn) then II chooses fn+1 = fn. Suppose cn+1 /∈ dom(fn)∪ rng(fn).
If cn+1 ∈M then II chooses any fn ∪{cn+1, dn+1} where dn+1 ∈ N \ rng(fn) which exists
since |fn| ≤ n but |N | ≥ k. If cn+1 ∈ N then II chooses any fn ∪ {dn+1, cn+1} where
dn+1 ∈M \ dom(fn) which exists since |fn| ≤ n but |M | ≥ k.
It follows from corollary 2.33 , that there is no sentence of the empty alphabet that
would characterize even cardinality in ﬁnite models (i.e. there is no such θ that for a ﬁnite
model, M |= θ if and only if |M | is even). However, our main application of the lemma
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is to prove that the Craig Interpolation Theorem cannot be directly stated in terms of
pseudo-ﬁnite models by replacing the relation ` by `FIN .
Example 3.10. There are ﬁnite alphabets L1 and L2 and Li sentences φi, i ∈ {1, 2} such
that `FIN φ1 → φ2 but no L1∩L2-sentence θ satisﬁes both `FIN φ1 → θ and `FIN θ → φ2.
Proof. Let L1 = {R} and L2 = {S} where R and S are distinct binary relation sym-
bols. Let φ1 say that R is an equivalence relation with all classes of size two and let φ2
say ¬ (S is an equivalence relation with all classes of size two except for one of size one).
Then `FIN φ1 → φ2.
Contrary to the claim of the example, suppose now that there is an L1 ∩L2-sentence θ
such that `FIN φ1 → θ and `FIN θ → φ2. Then θ is a sentence of the empty alphabet. Let
qr(θ) ≤ 2k and letM be an L1-model of cardinality 2k such thatM |= φ1. In addition, let
N be an L2-model of cardinality 2k + 1 such that N |= ¬φ2. ThenM |= θ but N |= ¬θ.
However, lemma 3.10 yieldsM |= θ if and only if N |= θ, a contradiction.
Example 2.11 shows that the classic version of Craig Interpolation Theorem does not
hold if restricted to pseudo-ﬁnite models. However, by using ΓL1 ∪ ΓL2 instead of ΓL1∪L2
we obtain an alternative formulation:
Theorem 3.11. Finite Craig Interpolation Theorem
Soppose ϕ is an L1-sentence and ψ an L2-sentence such that
ΓL1 ∪ ΓL2 ` ϕ→ ψ.
Then there is an L1 ∩ L2-sentence θ such that `FIN ϕ→ θ and `FIN θ → ψ.
Proof. By the Alternative Compactness Theorem (theorem 2.37), there is a ﬁnite
U = (S1 ∪ S2) ⊆ ΓL1 ∪ ΓL1 such that
S1 ∪ S2 ` ϕ→ ψ
and S1 ⊆ ΓL1 and S2 ⊆ ΓL2 . Now
S1 ∪ S2 ∪ {ϕ} ` ψ,
so
S1 ∪ {ϕ} `
∧
S2 → ψ,
so
` (
∧
S1 ∧ ϕ)→ (
∧
S2 → ψ).
By the Craig Interpolation Theorem there is an L1∩L2-sentence θ such that ` (
∧
S1∧ϕ)→
θ and ` θ → (∧S2 → ψ). Then
S1 ` ϕ→ θ and {θ} `
∧
S2 → ψ,
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so
S1 ` ϕ→ θ and S2 ∪ {θ} ` ψ,
so
S1 ` ϕ→ θ and S2 ` θ → ψ,
so
ΓL1 ` ϕ→ θ and ΓL2 ` θ → ψ.
Therefore `FIN ϕ→ θ and `FIN θ → ψ.
Alike Craig's theorem, the classic version of Robinson's cannot be stated directly in
terms of pseudo-ﬁnite models. We see this more easily by re-formulating the theorem:
Theorem 3.12. Alternative Robinson Consistency Theorem
Let Ti be a Li theory, i ∈ {1, 2}, such that each Ti has a model and all the L1∩L2-models
of T1 ∩ T2 are elemantary equivalent. Then T1 ∪ T2 has a model.
Proof. Directly by the Robinson Consistency Theorem, since T1 ∩ T2 is complete if and
only if all the L1 ∩ L2-models of T1 ∩ T2 are elemantary equivalent.
Example 3.13. There are alphabets Li and Li-theories Ti, i ∈ {1, 2}, such that each Ti
has a pseudo-ﬁnite model and all the pseudo-ﬁnite L1∩L2-models of T1∩T2 are elemantary
equivalent, but T1 ∪ T2 has no pseudo-ﬁnite model.
Proof. Let Li and φi, i ∈ {1, 2}, be as in example 2.11. We deﬁne theories T1 and T2 such
that both include the sentences
∃x0, . . . ,∃xn
∧
0≤i<j≤n
xi 6= xj
for all n ∈ N, in addition to which φ1 ∈ T1 and ¬φ2 ∈ T2. Now T1 is an L1-theory and
is satisﬁed by M = (N, R), where RM is an equivalence relation with all classes of size
two. Alike, T2 an L2-theory and is satisﬁed byM = (N, S), where SM is an equivalence
relation with all classes of size two except one of size one.. The models M and N are
shown pseudo-ﬁnite by example 3.8, which is proven independently of this example. Now
all the L1 ∩ L2 = ∅-models of T1 ∩ T2 are elementry equivalent by lemma 3.10, but there
is no pseudo-ﬁnite model that would satisfy T1 ∪ T2.
We obtain, however, the following:
Theorem 3.14. Finite Robinson Consistency Theorem
Let Ti be Li-theories, i ∈ {1, 2}, with pseudo-ﬁnite models. Suppose that the pseudo-
ﬁnite L1 ∩ L2 -models of T1 ∩ T2 are elementary equivalent. Then there is an L1 ∪ L2
-modelM such thatM |= T1 ∪ T2, andM  L1 andM  L2 are pseudo-ﬁnite.
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Proof. Theories T1 ∪ ΓL1 and T2 ∪ ΓL2 satisfy now the conditions of the classic Robinson
Consistency Theorem. Thus we obtain a modelM such thatM |= T1 ∪ T2 ∪ ΓL1 ∪ ΓL2 .
Now M |= T1 ∪ ΓL1 and M |= T2 ∪ ΓL2 , so M |= T1 ∪ T2 and M  (Li), i ∈ {1, 2}, is
pseudo-ﬁnite.
Also the classic Beth Deﬁnability Theorem fails when restricted to pseudo-ﬁnite models,
as we see below:
Example 3.15. There are an alphabet L, an n−ary relation symbol R and an L ∪ {R}
-sentence ϕ(R) such that for a new n-ary relation symbol S /∈ L,
{ϕ(R), ϕ(S)} `FIN ∀x1, . . . ,∀xn(R(x1, . . . , xn)↔ S(x1, . . . , xn)),
but there is no L-formula θ(x1, . . . , xn) such that
{ϕ(R)} `FIN ∀x1, . . . ,∀xn(R(x1, . . . , xn)↔ θ(x1, . . . , xn)).
Proof. Let us state the claim in an equivalent way:
There are an alphabet L, an n−ary relation symbol R and an L∪ {R} -sentence ϕ(R)
such that for a new n-ary relation symbol and a new constant symbol S, c /∈ L,
ΓL∪{R,S,c} ∪ {ϕ(R), ϕ(S)} ` R(c)↔ R′(c),
but there is no L-formula θ(x1, . . . , xn) such that
ΓL∪{R,RSc} ∪ {ϕ(R)} ` (R(c)↔ θ(c)).
Let L = {<} where < is a binary relation symbol and let L-sentence ψ say that the
relation < is a strict total order. In addition, suppose R,S, c /∈ L, where is R,S are unary
relation symbols and ϕ(R) the following L ∪ {R}-sentence:
(∀v0(∀v1(v0 6= v1 → v0 < v1)→ ¬R(v0))
∧∀v0∀v1(((v0 < v1) ∧ (@v2(v0 < v2 < v1)))→ ((¬R(v0)↔ R(v1))).
Let M be now a ﬁnite L ∪ {R}-model such that M |= ψ ∧ ϕ(R). Then <M is a
well-order and for all a ∈ M , R(a) if and only if a has an even rank in <M. Deﬁne
φ(R) := ψ ∧ϕ(R). Then φ(R)∧ φ(S) `FIN R(c)↔ S(c), but if θ(x) is an L-formula such
that ϕ(R) `FIN ∀x(θ(x)↔ R(x))), then θ(a) says that the element a has an even rank in
<M. Now if an L-formula σ(x) deﬁnes x as the element with the highest rank in < then
∀x(σ(x) → θ(x)) deﬁnes the cardinality of a ﬁnite, ordered {<}-model as even, which by
theorem 2.30 is impossible.
Similar Finite Craig Interpolation, we obtain a pseudo-ﬁnite version for the Beth De-
ﬁnability Theorem by splitting ΓL∪{R,R′} into ΓL∪{R} ∪ ΓL∪{R}.
27
Theorem 3.16. Finite Beth Deﬁnability Theorem.
Suppose R,S /∈ L are new n-ary relation symbols and ϕ(R) an L ∪ {R}-sentence. Let
ΓL∪{R} ∪ ΓL∪{S} ∪ {ϕ(R), ϕ(S)} ` ∀x1, . . . ,∀xn(R(x1, . . . , xn)↔ S(x1, . . . , xn)).
Then there is an L-formula θ(x1, . . . , xn) such that
{ϕ(R)} `FIN ∀x1, . . . ,∀xn(R(x1, . . . , xn)↔ θ(x1, . . . , xn)).
Proof. The theorem is equivalent to the following formulation:
Claim 1. Suppose R,S /∈ L are new n-ary relation symbols, ϕ(R) an L∪{R}-sentence
and c = (c1, . . . , cn) /∈ L new constant symbols. Let
ΓL∪{R,c} ∪ ΓL∪{S,c} ∪ {ϕ(R), ϕ(S)} ` R(c)↔ S(c)).
Then there is an L-formula θ(x1, . . . , xn) such that
{ϕ(R)} `FIN (R(c)↔ θ(c)).
We prove claim 1.
By the assumption,
ΓL∪{R,c} ∪ ΓL∪{S,c} ` (ϕ(R) ∧R(c))→ (ϕ(S)→ S(c)).
By applying the Finite Craig Interpolation Theorem here we obtain an L ∪ {c}-sentence
θ(c) such that
`FIN (ϕ(R) ∧R(c))→ θ(c) and `FIN θ(c)→ (ϕ(S)→ S(c)),
so
ΓL∪{R,c} ` (ϕ(R) ∧R(c))→ θ(c) and ΓL∪{S,c} ` θ(c)→ (ϕ(S)→ R′(c)).
This yields
ΓL∪{R,c} ∪ {ϕ(R)} ` R(c)→ θ(c) and ΓL∪{S,c} ∪ {ϕ(S)} ` θ(c)→ S(c).
Since S,R /∈ L, the right side of the above implies
ΓL∪{R,c} ∪ {ϕ(R)} ` θ(c)→ R(c).
Therefore
ΓL∪{R,c} ∪ {ϕ(R)} ` R(c)↔ θ(c),
so
{ϕ(R)} `FIN R(c)↔ θ(c).
 Claim1.
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3.4 A Lindström Theorem
First-order logic has a characterization, the Lindström Theorem, stating that any extension
of ﬁrst-order logic that satisﬁes both the Compactness Theorem and the Löwenheim-
Skolem Theorem has no sentence that wouldn't be equivalent to some ﬁrst-order sentece
[1]. As we shall see, under certain conditions the same holds when we restrict to pseudo-
ﬁnite models.
Deﬁnition 3.17. Inspired by [4] and [5]
(i) An abtract logic is a triple L = (S, F, |=), where |=⊆ S×F . Elements of the class
S are called the models of L, elements of F are called the sentences of L, and the relation
|= is called the satisfaction relation of L. IfM ∈ S and ϕ ∈ F , thenM |= ϕ means that
ϕ is true inM and thatM is a model of ϕ, whileM 6|= ϕ means the opposite.
(ii) L is closed under conjuction if for all ϕ,ψ ∈ F there is θ ∈ F such that for all
M∈ S,M |= θ if and only ifM |= ϕ andM |= ψ.
(iii) Suppose everyM∈ S is a τ -model for some alphabet τ , in the sense of deﬁnition
2.7. Then L is closed under negation if for all ϕ ∈ F and for all τ there is θ ∈ F such
that for all τ -models,M∈ S,M |= θ if and only ifM 6|= ϕ.
(iv) Lωω = (Str, FO, |=) denotes the normal (relational) ﬁrst-order logic, where Str
consists of all models and FO of all formulas of any alphabet. If L∗ = (S∗, F ∗, |=∗) and
M,N ∈ S∗, we say that M and N are isomorphic if they are isomorphic in Lωω. In
addition, we say that L∗ is closed under isomorphisms, if whenever ϕ ∈ F ,M and N
being isomorphic in Lωω implies thatM |= ϕ if and only if N |= ϕ.
(v) For L = (S, F, |=), any T ⊆ F is called a theory.
Deﬁnition 3.18. (i) If L∗ = (S, F, |=∗), we say that L∗ relativizes if for all ϕ ∈ F and
all unary relation symbols U ∈ τ there is ϕ(U) ∈ F such that for all M ∈ S, such that
M  UM is a model,M |=∗ ϕ(U) if and only ifM  UM |=∗ ϕ.
(ii) If L = (S, F, |=) and L∗ = (S, F ∗, |=∗) are absract logics, L ≤ L∗ on ﬁnite models
means that for all ϕ ∈ F there is ψ ∈ F ∗ such that for all ﬁnite M ∈ S, M |= ϕ if and
only ifM |= ψ. In this case we also say that every ϕ ∈ L is deﬁnable in L∗.
In this case we also say that every ϕ ∈ F ∗ is deﬁnable in L′ on ﬁnite models.
(iii) If L∗ = (S, F, |=∗) and M ∈ S, then let us call M L∗-pseudo-ﬁnite, if every
ϕ ∈ F true in M is true also in a ﬁnite N ∈ S. If the referenced logic L∗ is clear by
association, then we simply say thatM is pseudo-ﬁnite.
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As with ﬁrst-order logic, any set of sentences is called a theory. Given an alphabet τ , an
abstract logic L∗ = (S, F, |=∗) satisﬁes the Finite Compactness Theorem if whenever
T is a theory in L∗, every ﬁnite subset of which has a pseudo-ﬁnite model, then T has a
pseudo-ﬁnite model. L∗ satisﬁes the Finite Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem, if whenever
T is a countable theory in L∗ and T has a pseudo-ﬁnite model, then T has a countable
pseudo-ﬁnite model.
Deﬁnition 3.19. Let L∗ = (S, F, |=∗) be an abstract logic, T a theory in L∗ and ϕ ∈ F .
Then by T `FIN ϕ we mean that for every pseudo-ﬁniteM∈ S, ifM |= ψ for all ψ ∈ F ,
thenM |= ϕ. If T = ∅, then we write `FIN ϕ.
Theorem 3.20. Theorem 3 of [2].
Let Lωω = (Str, FO, |=) and let L∗ = (Str, F, |=∗) be an abstract logic such that for
all θ ∈ F there is a ﬁnite alphabet τ such that M |= θ or M |= ¬θ for all τ -models M.
Suppose FO ⊆ F , Lωω ≤ L∗ on ﬁnite models, L∗ is closed under negation, conjunction
and isomorphisms, it relativizes and |=⊆|=∗. Suppose L∗ satisﬁes the Finite Compactness
Theorem and the Finite Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem. Then L∗ ≤ Lωω on ﬁnite models.
Proof. Suppose θ ∈ F is not ﬁrst-order deﬁnable on ﬁnite models and τ is a ﬁnite alphabet
such that M |= θ or M |= ¬θ for all τ -models M. Let φm,ki , i ≤ q(m, k), form a list of
τ -formulas of quantiﬁer rank ≤ k such that
(i) if i ≤ q(m, k), then no other variables than v0, . . . , vn appear free in φi
(ii) for any τ -formula ψ, qr(ψ) ≤ k, in which no other variables than v0, . . . , vn appear
free, there is i ≤ q(m, k) such that ψ is equivalent with φm,ki .
Such a list φm,ki , i ≤ q(m, k), exists by lemma 2.21, since τ is ﬁnite by assumption.
Now let
φk =
∧
{φ0,ki : i ≤ q(0, k),`FIN θ → φ0,ki }.
The set deﬁning sentence φk is non-empty as the sentences φ0,kn , n < q(0, k), include
some that are true in all τ -models, such as the sentence ∃x(x = x), or someone equivalent
to it. Therefore the sentence φk exists. Now `FIN θ → φk, since φk is of the form
∧
Ψ,
where `FIN θ → ϕ for all ϕ ∈ Ψ. On the other hand 0FIN φk → θ, as otherwise we had
`FIN θ ↔ φk, meaning that φk deﬁnes θ, which would go against the assumption that θ is
not ﬁrst-order deﬁnable on ﬁnite models. Thus we can choose a ﬁnite Ak |= φk ∧ ¬θ. Let
ψk =
∧
{φ0,kn : n < q(0, k),Ak |= φ0,kn }.
If it were now that `FIN θ → ¬ψk, then ¬ψk ∈ Ψ, where φk =
∧
Ψ, implying that
`FIN φk → ¬ψk, which is in contradiction with Ak |= φk ∧ ψk. Therefore we can choose
a ﬁnite Bk |= θ ∧ ψk. Now the Lωω-sentences true in Bk with ≤ k variable symbols are
precisely the same ones that are true in Ak, by the deﬁnition of ψk, so Ak ≡k Bk (where
≡k 7 refers to Lωω-senteces only). However, Ak |= ¬θ and Bk |= θ.
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Given sets X Y , nd m ∈ N, let YX := {s : X → Y }, and for q, p ∈ N, q, p ≥ 1, let
qY := {s : {1, . . . , q} → Y }, Xq := {s : X → {1, . . . , q}} and qp := {s : {1, . . . , q} →
{1, . . . , p}}.
Let R,S /∈ τ be new unary relation symbols. Based on the assumtion made for language
L∗, relativizations ϕ(S) and (¬ϕ)(R) are included in F for any ϕ ∈ F . For every τ -atomic
formula ψ(x1, . . . , xk), let Φvi→vi+1(ψ) be the formula
ψ(R)(v1, v3, . . . , v2k−1)↔ ψ(S)(v2, v4, . . . , v2k),
and let Θi→i+1(ψ)(x1, . . . , x2k) be∧{
Φvi→vi+1(ψ)
(
(x1/vs(1))(x2/vs(1)+1) . . . (x2k−1/vs(2k)−1)(x2k/vs(2k))
)
: s ∈k k}.
Then let H denote the set of all τ -atomic formulas and let Υn(v1 . . . , v2n) be the
conjunction of the set {
Θi→i+1(ψ)(v1 . . . , v2n) : ψ ∈ H
}
.
Now then, if M is a τ -model such that M  RM ⊆ M, M  SM ⊆ M and M |=
Υn(a1, b1, . . . , an, bn) for a1, . . . , an ∈ RM, b1, . . . , bn ∈ SM, then ai 7→ bi is a partial
isomorphism X →M  SM, X ⊆M  RM.
Let P and F be relation symbols such that #P = 2 and #F = 5. Let T be the
τ ∪ {R,S, P, F}-theory consisting of the following sentences:
1. For all n ∈ N and all n−ary τ -function symbols f , ∀x1 . . . ∀xn((R(x1, . . . , xn) →
R(f(x1, . . . , xn)) ∧ (S(x1, . . . , xn)→ S(f(x1, . . . , xn))))
2. θ(S)
3. (¬θ)(R)
4. ∀x∀y(((P (x, y) ∧ P (y, x)) → x = y) ∧ ((P (x, y) ∧ P (y, z)) → P (x, z)) ∧ (P (x, y) ∨
P (y, x)))
5. ϕn ∧ ψn, n ∈ N \ {0, 1}, where
ψn := ∀x1 . . . ∀xn∀y1 . . . ∀y2n∀z1 . . . ∀z2n
(( ∧
1≤i≤n−1
P (xi, xi+1)
∧
∧
2≤i≤2n
F (yi−1, zi−1; yi, zi;xi)
)
→ ∧
( ∧
1≤i≤2n
R(yi)∧S(zi)∧Υ2n(y1, z1 . . . , y2n, z2n)
))
and
ϕn := ∀x1 . . . ∀xn∀y1 . . . ∀y2n∀z1 . . . ∀z2n−1∃z2n
(( ∧
1≤i≤n−1
P (xi, xi+1)
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∧
2≤i≤2n−1
F (yi−1, zi−1; yi, zi;xi)
)
→ F (y2n−1, z2n−1; y2n, z2n;x2n)
)
∧∀x1 . . . ∀xn∀z1 . . . ∀z2n∀y1 . . . ∀y2n−1∃y2n
(( ∧
1≤i≤n−1
P (xi, xi+1)
∧
2≤i≤2n−1
F (yi−1, zi−1; yi, zi;xi)
)
→ F (y2n−1, z2n−1; y2n, z2n;x2n)
)
6. ϕ for all ϕ ∈ ΓL∗ .
Suppose now a τ ∪ {R,S, P, F}-model M satisﬁes U ⊆ T , where U includes all the
sentences clauses 1-4 and a ﬁnitely many of the sentences in clauses 5 and 6. Deﬁne
LR := L \ {c ∈ L : cM /∈ RM} and LS := L \ {c ∈ L : cM /∈ SM}. Now clause 1 implies
that R,S are τ -models, when we deﬁne them so that R  LR = M  (RM, LR) and
S  LS =M  (SM, LS). Furthermore, for every set X, |X| = |dom(R)|, R is isomorphic
to some model R∗ where dom(R∗) = X, we may assume {cS : c ∈ L} ⊆ dom(R). In
addition, by automorphism, we may assume cR = cS for all c ∈ L.
Clause 4 ensures that PM is a linear order, and clause 5 that there is a PM-ranked
back-and-forth system in alphabet τ between R and S.
Now for every k ∈ N, let L∗∗-model Ck be such that dom(Ck) = dom(Ak) ∪ dom(Bk),
Ck  dom(Ak, L) = Ak, Ck  dom(Bk, L) = Bk, RCk = dom(Ak) and SCk = dom(Bk).
Based on theorem 2.34, we can interpret P in Ck so that for every n ∈ N there is such a
k ∈ N that there is a P Ck -ranked back-and-forth system (Ij)j∈PCk in τ between Ak and
Bk, such that
(i) P Ck = {(p0, p1), . . . , (pn−1, pk)} is a linear order
(ii) Ij0 = ∅.
(*)As for the relation symbol F , we interpret it so that F Ck(a, b, c, d, p) if and only if
p = pj for some j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and there is f ∈ Ipj−1 such that a ∈ dom(f), f(a) = b and
f ∪ (c, d) ∈ Ipj .
Now Ck satisﬁes sentences 1, 2 and 3 of T since dom(Ck) = dom(Ak) ∪ dom(Bk),
Ck  dom(Ak, L) = Ak, Ck  dom(Bk, L) = Bk, RCk = dom(Ak) and SCk = dom(Bk),
Ak |= ¬θ and Bk |= θ. Sentence 4 holds since P Ck is a linear order and any number of the
sentences in 6. hold as Ck is ﬁnite. In addition, for every n ∈ N \ {0, 1}, there is a k ∈ N
such that Ck |= ϕm ∧ ψm for every ϕm ∧ ψm of 5. with m ≤ n, since ϕm ∧ ψm, m ≤ n, are
true in Ck precisely if F is interpret as in (*) and Ck includes a P Ck -ranked back-and-forth
system (Ij)j∈PCk in τ between Ak and Bk, such that (Ij)j∈PCk satisﬁes the conditions (i)
and (ii), which Ck will do for a k ∈ N big enough, as we saw above.
Thus any ﬁnite U ⊂ T can be expanded into a ﬁnite T ∗ ⊂ T such that, for some k ∈ N,
Ck |= T ∗, which implies Ck |= U . Therefore the Finite Compactness Theorem yields that
there is a model C for the whole T . By the Finite Löwenheim-Skolem theorem, we may
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take that C is countable. Let C  (RC , L) =: R and C  (SC , L) =: S. Now R and S are
isomorphic by theorem 2.33. However, R |= ¬θ and S |= θ, which is a contradiction.
4 Characterizing pseudo-ﬁniteness
4.1 Existence of a ﬁnite model
In this section we prove theorems stating exact conditions on whether a sentence has a
ﬁnite model. We also illustrate a construction of a ﬁnite model for a sentence that has one
but displays no function symbols, using the substructure of a given model satisfying the
sentence.
Deﬁnition 4.1. Let ψ be a formula.
(i) We deﬁne the set of subformulas of ψ, Sub(ψ), as follows:
ψ ∈ Sub(ψ)
If φ ∈ Sub(ψ) and θ ∈ Sub(φ) then θ ∈ Sub(ψ)
If φ ∈ Sub(ψ) and φ ∈ {¬θ,∀xθ,∃xθ}, then θ ∈ Sub(ψ)
If φ ∈ Sub(ψ) and φ = θ ∧ σ then θ, σ ∈ Sub(ψ).
(ii) If φ ∈ Sub(ψ) and θ ∈ Sub(φ) then we notate φ ∈ Sub(ψ, θ)
If φ ∈ Sub(ψ), we notate φ ≤ ψ, and if φ ≤ ψ but φ 6= ψ, we notate φ < ψ.
(iii) The set of existential subformulas of ψ, ESub(ψ), is the set of those subformulas
of ψ that are of the form ∃xφ with x free in φ.
If φ ∈ Sub(ψ) and θ ∈ Sub(φ) then ESub(ψ, θ) := Sub(ψ, θ) ∩ ESub(ψ).
Deﬁnition 4.2. Let ψ be a formula.
(i) We say ψ is in the quantiﬁers-ﬁrst-form if every subformula of ψ that has bound
variables is of the form ∃xφ or ∀xφ.
(ii) If ψ is in the quantiﬁers-ﬁrst-form, then φ ∈ Sub(ψ) is obtained by no other
than quantiﬁer removal if φ is in the quantiﬁers-ﬁrst-form.
(iii) If ψ is in the quantiﬁers-ﬁrst-form, then φ ∈ Sub(ψ) is the last subformula
of ψ obtained by no other than quantiﬁer removal, if φ is unquantiﬁed but any
θ ∈ Sub(ψ, φ), θ 6= φ, is quantiﬁed.
Lemma 4.3. For every formula ψ there is an equivalent formula that is in the quantiﬁers-
ﬁrst-form.
Proof. We ﬁrst observe that for all L-formulas θ(xi) and φ, where the variable symbol xi
does not appear free in φ, the following holds:
` ¬∀xiθ ↔ ∃xi¬θ
` ¬∃xiθ ↔ ∀xi¬θ
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` φ ∧ ∀xiθ ↔ ∀xi(φ ∧ θ) and
` φ ∧ ∃xiθ ↔ ∃xi(φ ∧ θ).
Proof of the lemma by induction on ψ.
(1) ψ is atomic: ψ has no subformulas with bound variables so ψ is itself is in the
quantiﬁers-ﬁrst-form.
(2) ψ = ∀xφ or ψ = ∃xφ: Directly by the induction assumption.
(3) ψ = ¬φ: We may now assume φ is in the quantiﬁers-ﬁrst-form.
If φ is unquantiﬁed then so is ψ, and thus by deﬁnition, ψ is in the quantiﬁers-ﬁrst-form.
If φ = ∀xθ then θ is in the quantiﬁers-ﬁrst-form, qr(θ) = n, and ` ψ ↔ ∃x¬θ, so by
induction assumption, ` ψ ↔ ∃xσ for some σ that is in the quantiﬁers-ﬁrst-form; thus ψ
is equivalent to a formula in the quantiﬁers-ﬁrst-form.
If φ = ∃xθ then θ is in the quantiﬁers-ﬁrst-form, qr(θ) = n, and ` ψ ↔ ∀x¬θ, so by
induction assumption, ` ψ ↔ ∀xσ for some σ that is in the quantiﬁers-ﬁrst-form; thus ψ
is equivalent to a formula in the quantiﬁers-ﬁrst-form.
(4) ψ = φ ∧ θ: We may now assume φ and θ are in the quantiﬁers-ﬁrst-form. Now
all the variable symbols that occur bounded in φ and θ belong to a set {vi : 0 ≤ i ≤ p}
for some p ≥ 1. Suppose φ∗ is a formula obtained from φ by replacing each variable
symbol vi that occurs bounded in φ by variable vi+2p (i.e. every appearance of vi, even
in quantiﬁers ∃vi or ∀vi, is replaced by vi+2p), and θ∗ is a formula obtained from θ by
replacing each variable symbol vi that occurs bounded in θ by variable vi+4p. Then clearly
` φ ↔ φ∗ and ` θ ↔ θ∗. Now φ∗ = wσ and θ∗ = w′τ for some unquantiﬁed formulas σ
and τ and sign sequences w and w′, each consisting of signs of the forms ∃x and ∀y where
x, y ∈ {vi : 2p ≤ i ≤ 3p} for the variables appearing in w and x, y ∈ {vi : 4p ≤ i ≤ 5p} for
the variables appearing in w′. Clearly ` φ∗∧θ∗ ↔ ww′(σ∧τ), where ww′(σ∧τ) is a formula
in the quantiﬁers-ﬁrst-form. In addition, ` φ↔ φ∗ and ` θ ↔ θ∗ so ` ψ ↔ ww′(σ ∧ τ).
Deﬁnition 4.4. Let B ⊆ Xn.
(i) For 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the i-th projection of B, PriB, is the set
{bi : (b1, . . . , bn) ∈ B}.
(ii) For 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the early part of B until i, B≤i, is the set
{(b1, . . . , bi) : (b1, . . . , bn) ∈ B}.
(iii) The collapse of B, Col(B) is the set{
bi : 1 ≤ i ≤ n, (b1, . . . , bn) ∈ B
}
.
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Deﬁnition 4.5. SupposeM is an L-model.
(i) Let ∃yψ(x, y), x = (x1, . . . , xn) be an L-formula. The set of Skolem functions
of ψ inM, Skolem(ψ,M), consists of functions f : {a ∈Mn :M |= ∃ψ(a, y)} →M that
satisfy the following: If a ∈ dom(f), thenM |= ψ(a, f(a)). If n = 0 then Skolem(ψ,M) =
{a ∈M :M |= ψ(a)}
(ii) Let ϕ be an L-sentence in quantiﬁers-ﬁrst-form, ψ(x), x = (x1, . . . , xn−1), a subfor-
mula of ϕ obtained by no other than quantiﬁer removal and let {θ1, . . . , θn} ⊆ Sub(ϕ,ψ)
be maximal such that θ2 has one more free variable than θ1, and if n ≥ 2 and 1 ≤
i < j ≤ n, then θi < θj and θj has one more free variable than θi. Further, list
ESub(ϕ,ψ) = {φ1, . . . , φk}, where φi < φj when 1 ≤ i < j ≤ k, and for each 1 ≤ i ≤ k,
let fφi ∈ Skolem(ψ,M). If A ⊆ Mn, then a Skolem closure of A from ϕ to ψ by
fφ1 , . . . , fφk , notated as (A¯, ϕ, ψ, fφ1 , . . . , fφk), is the set⋃
i∈N
Ai,
where A0 ⊆ A1 ⊆ . . .Mn satisﬁes the following:
A0 = A.
For i ≥ 1, Ai is the smallest set that holds the following:
If 1 ≤ j ≤ n and θj /∈ ESub(ϕ,ψ), then
(a1, . . . , aj , b, aj+2, . . . , an) ∈ Ai
for every (a1, . . . , an) ∈ Ai−1 and b ∈ Col(Ai−1) ∪ Col((Ai)≤j−1).
If 1 ≤ j ≤ n and θj ∈ ESub(ϕ,ψ), then
(a1, . . . , aj , fθj (a1, . . . , aj)) ∈ (Ai)≤j
for every (a1, . . . , aj−1) ∈ (Ai)≤j−1.
Deﬁnition 4.6. Let M be an L-model and ϕ an L-sentence in quantiﬁers-ﬁrst-form.
Given a subformula ψ(x), x = (x0, . . . , xn), of ϕ obtained by no other than quantiﬁer
removal, REC(ψ,M, ϕ) ⊆ P(Mn) is the set of realizing element collections of ψ in
(M, ϕ), if the following holds:
(i) If ψ is a sentence, then REC(ψ,M, ϕ) = ∅
(ii) If ∀yψ = φ or ∃yψ = φ, where φ is also a subformula of ϕ and y is bounded in ψ,
then REC(ψ,M, ϕ) = REC(φ,M, ϕ)
(iii) If ∀yψ = φ, where φ is also a subformula of ϕ and y is free in ψ, and γ is the set
of L-constant symbols in ϕ, then
REC(ψ,M, ϕ) = {A× (Col(A) ∪ {cM : c ∈ γ}) : A ∈ REC(φ,M, ϕ)},
except if REC(φ,M, ϕ) = ∅, in which case
REC(ψ,M, ϕ) = {{a, cM : c ∈ γ} : a ∈M}
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(iv) If ∃yψ = φ, where φ is also a subformula of ϕ and y is free in ψ =: φk, and if
ESub(ϕ,ψ) = {φ1, . . . , φk}, then REC(ψ,M, ϕ) is the set{
(A× fφkA,ϕ, ψ, fφ1 , . . . , fφk) : A ∈ REC(φ,M, ϕ), fφi ∈ Skolem(φi,M), φi ∈ ESub(ϕ, φ)
}
.
Lemma 4.7. SupposeM is an L-model, ϕ an L-sentence in quantiﬁers-ﬁrst-form,M |= ϕ
and τ is the set of L-symbols appearing in ϕ. Let θ be the last subformula of ϕ obtained by
no other than quantiﬁer removal, let B ∈ REC(θ,M, ϕ) and let A be the collapse of B.
Suppose A :=M  (A, τ) ⊆M  τ . Then for all φ(x) ∈ Sub(ϕ), φ ≥ θ, x = (x1, . . . , xn),
and a ∈ B≤n, A |= φ(a) ifM |= φ(a).
Proof. By induction on φ ∈ Sub(ϕ), φ ≥ θ.
(1) φ = θ: By A ⊆M since θ is unquantiﬁed.
(2) φ = ∀yσ or φ = ∃yσ and y is bounded in σ: Directly by the induction assumption.
(3) φ = ∀yσ and y is free in σ: SupposeM |= φ(a). ThenM |= σ(a, b) for any b ∈M ,
soM |= σ(a, b) for any b ∈ A. Hence the induction assumption yields A |= σ(a, b) for any
b ∈ A, which implies A |= φ(a).
(4) φ = ∃yσ where y is free in σ: Suppose M |= φ(a). Then M |= σ(a, b) for some
b ∈M . Now σ has n+ 1 free variables, so fB≤n ⊆ Prn+1B for some f ∈ Skolem(φ,M),
so M |= σ(a, f(a)) where (a, f(a)) ∈ B≤n+1. Therefore the induction assumption yields
A |= σ(a, f(a)) and subsequently A |= φ(a).
Theorem 4.8. Suppose L has no function symbols and L-sentence ϕ is in quantiﬁers-
ﬁrst-form. Then ϕ has a ﬁnite model if and only if it has a modelM such that there is a
ﬁnite A ∈ REC(ψ,M, ϕ), where ψ is the last subformula of ϕ obtained by no other than
quantiﬁer removal.
Proof. ” ⇐ ”: Suppose ϕ has a modelM such that there is a ﬁnite B ∈ REC(ψ,M, ϕ),
where ψ is the last subformula of ϕ obtained by no other than quantiﬁer removal. Let τ be
the set of L-symbols appearing in ϕ and let A be the collapse of B. Then A is non-empty,
so τ having no function symbols,M  (A, τ) ⊆M  τ , and subsequently A =M  (A, τ)
is a model. Now lemma 4.7 yields that for all φ(x) ∈ Sub(ϕ), φ ≥ θ, x = (x1, . . . , xn), and
a ∈ B, A |= φ(a) ifM |= φ(a). HenceM |= ϕ implies A |= ϕ, where A is ﬁnite.
” ⇒ ” We make a counter claim: For any L-modelM satisfying ϕ and for ψ the last
subformula of ϕ obtained by no other than quantiﬁer removal, every A ∈ REC(ψ,M, ϕ) is
inﬁnite. Then the collapse ofA is also inﬁnite, meaning that every L-modelM that satisﬁes
ϕ has an inﬁnite subset and is consequently inﬁnite. This contradicts the assumption that
ϕ has a ﬁnite model.
Theorem 4.9. Suppose L has no function symbols and L-sentence ϕ is in quantiﬁers-ﬁrst-
form. Then ϕ has a ﬁnite model if and only if it has a model M such that the following
holds:
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Let τ is the set of L-symbols appearing in ϕ and let θ be the last subformula of ϕ
obtained by no other than quantiﬁer removal. Then there is a ﬁnite B ∈ REC(θ,M, ϕ),
such that if A is the collapse of B, then A :=M  (A, τ) ⊆M  τ , A is ﬁnite and A |= ϕ.
Proof. If the conditions hold then ϕ clearly has a ﬁnite model. To show the other direction,
suppose ϕ has a ﬁnite model. Let τ is the set of L-symbols appearing in ϕ. Let θ be the
last subformula of ϕ obtained by no other than quantiﬁer removal, let B ∈ REC(θ,M, ϕ)
be ﬁnite as provided by theorem 4.8, and let A be the collapse of B. Since L has no
function symbols, M  (A, τ) ⊆ M  τ . Deﬁne A := M  (A, τ). Then A is ﬁnite.
In addition, lemma 4.7 yields that for all φ(x) ∈ Sub(ϕ), φ ≥ θ, x = (x1, . . . , xn), and
a ∈ B≤n, A |= φ(a) ifM |= φ(a). ThereforeM |= ϕ implies A |= ϕ.
Lemma 4.10. Suppose M is an L-model, ϕ an L-sentence in quantiﬁers-ﬁrst-form and
M |= ϕ. Let ψ a subformula of ϕ obtained by no other than quantiﬁer removal and let
A ∈ REC(ψ,M, ϕ). ThenM |= ψ(a) for all a ∈ A.
Proof. By induction on ψ, a subformula of ϕ obtained by no other than quantiﬁer removal.
The induction goes "downward": Based on the assumption that the claim holds for φ, a
subformula of ϕ obtained by no other than quantiﬁer removal such that ψ < φ, we prove
it holds for ψ.
(1) ψ is a sentence: By the assumptionM |= ϕ, since in this case ψ is equivalent to ϕ.
(2) ∀yψ = φ or ∃yψ = φ, where φ is also a subformula of ϕ and y is bounded in ψ:
Then ` ψ ↔ φ and REC(ψ,M, ϕ) = REC(σ,M, ϕ), so the induction claim returns to
the induction assumption.
(3) ∀yψ = φ, where φ is also a subformula of ϕ and y is free in ψ: Suppose γ is the set
of L-constant symbols in ϕ. If REC(φ,M, ϕ) = ∅, then
REC(ψ,M, ϕ) = {{b, cM : c ∈ γ} : b ∈M}.
Now ` φ↔ ϕ andM |= ϕ soM |= ∀yψ(y), which yieldsM |= ψ(a) for any
a ∈ {b, cM : c ∈ γ} for any b ∈M .
If REC(φ,M, ϕ) 6= ∅ then
REC(ψ,M, ϕ) = {A× (Col(A) ∪ {cM : c ∈ γ}) : A ∈ REC(φ,M, ϕ)}.
Let A ∈ REC(φ,M, ϕ). Now the induction assumption yieds M |= φ(a) for all a ∈ A.
ThereforeM |= ψ(a, b) for any a ∈ A, b ∈M , soM |= ψ(a) for any
a ∈ A× (Col(A) ∪ {cM : c ∈ γ}).
(4) ∃yψ = φ, where φ is also a subformula of ϕ and y is free in ψ =: φk: Let
ESub(ϕ,ψ) = {φ1, . . . , φk}. Then REC(ψ,M, ϕ) is the set{
(A× fφkA,ϕ, ψ, fφ1 , . . . , fφk) : A ∈ REC(φ,M, ϕ), fφi ∈ Skolem(φi,M), φi ∈ ESub(ϕ, φ)
}
.
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Let A ∈ REC(φ,M, ϕ)}. The induction assumption yiedsM |= φ(a) for any a ∈ A. Thus
the deﬁnition of a Skolem closure impliesM |= ψ(a) for any
a ∈ (A× fφkA,ϕ, ψ, fφ1 , . . . , fφk)
and any fφi ∈ Skolem(φi,M) and φi ∈ ESub(ϕ, φ).
From here on we use the following notation: if ψ(x), x = (x1, . . . , xn), is a formula,M
an L-model and a ∈Mn, then by ψ(a) we meanM |= ψ(a) if the model ψ(a) refers to is
clear from context.
Lemma 4.11. A consistent L-sentence ϕ is true in inﬁnite models only, if and only if
there is an L-formula σ(x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , yk) such that for all L-models M satisfying ϕ
there is (ai, bi)i∈N, ai ∈Mn, such that for all i ∈ N,
(i) σ(ai, bi)
(ii) for any c ∈ {c ∈Mk : σ(ai+1, c)},
Col({c}) * Col({a0, . . . , ai}).
Proof. "⇐": If the conditions hold then for any modelM satisfying ϕ, clearly ai 6= aj if
i 6= j, so M has an inﬁnite subset and is therefore inﬁnite itself.
"⇒":
Claim 1. It suﬃces to prove the "⇒" of the lemma for alphabets L that have no
function symbols.
Proof of claim 1. Let ψ(x), x = (x1, . . . , xk), be an L-formula and f an n-ary function
symbol that appears in ψ and let R /∈ L be a new n + 1-ary relation symbol. Suppose
we obtain ψ′ from ϕ by replacing every occurance of f(z) = y, (z, y) = (z1, . . . , zn, y) any
variable symbols, by R(z, y), and suppose ψ∗ = ψ′ ∧ σ, where σ is the formula
∀x1 . . . ∀xn∃yR(x1, . . . , xn, y)
∧∀x1 . . . ∀xn∀y∀z′
(
R(x1, . . . , xn, y) ∧ (R(x1, . . . , xn, z′)→ z′ = y)
)
.
LetM be an L-model andM∗ an (L\{f})∪{R}-model such thatM∗  L\{f} =M 
L\{f} and for all (a1, . . . , an, b) ∈Mn+1, RM∗(a1, . . . , an, b) iﬀ fM(a1, . . . , an) = b. Then
clearly for all a ∈Mk,M |= ψ(a) if and only ifM∗ |= ψ∗(a). Using the same method for
an arbitrary L-formula φ(x), x = (x1, . . . , xn), we can obtain an (L \ {f}) ∪ {R}-formula
φ∗ which satisﬁesM |= φ(a) iﬀM∗ |= φ(a)∗ for all (a1, . . . , an, b) ∈Mn.
Applying the same reasoning for a potentially multiple times we reach an alphabet τ
that is obtained from L by replacing every L-function symbol f by a #f − ary relation
symbol Rf and a τ -modelM′,M′  L ∩ τ =M  L ∩ τ such that
(a) for all n-ary function symbols f and all (a1, . . . , an, b) ∈Mn+1, RM′f (a1, . . . , an, b)
iﬀ fM(a1, . . . , an) = b
38
(b) for an arbitrary L-formula φ(x), x = (x1, . . . , xn), we can obtain an τ -formula φ
′
which satisﬁesM |= φ(a) iﬀM′ |= φ(a)′ for all (a1, . . . , an, b) ∈Mn.
Suppose now that given any formula ψ and modelM, ψ′ andM′ mean the τ -formula
and the τ -model that are obtained from ψ and M by the above technique. Further,
within this paragraph, suppose that if we refer to a formula ψ′ or a modelM′, then they
are obtained from some ψ and M by the aforesaid technique. Note that the operators
φ 7→ φ′ andM 7→M′ are injective, so given ψ′ andM′, the formula φ and modelM they
attribute to are unambiguous. Therefore we may state the following: there is an an L-
formula ψ(x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , yk) such that for any L-modelM satisfying ϕ there is (ai)i∈N,
ai ∈Mn, satisfying conditions (1) and (2), if there is a τ -formula ψ′(x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , yk)
such that for any τ -modelM′ satisfying ϕ′ there is (ai)i∈N, ai ∈ (M)′n, that satisﬁes (1)
and (2). Hence the claim "⇒" of the lemma is equivalent to the claim that is otherwise
identical but restricts to alphabets that have no function symbols.  Claim 1.
Hence we may assume from here on that L has no function symbols. We assume ϕ
is true in inﬁnite models only and that M is an L-model that satisﬁes ϕ. Let φ be the
last subformula of ϕ obtained by no other than quantiﬁer removal. Then by theorem
4.8, every A ∈ REC(φ,M, ϕ) is inﬁnite. Since REC(φ,M, ϕ) ⊆ REC(ψ,M, ϕ) for all
ψ ∈ Sub(ϕ, φ) and REC(ϕ,M, ϕ) = ∅, there is a ψ ∈ Sub(ϕ, φ) such that REC(ψ,M, ϕ)
consists of inﬁnite sets only but for any σ ∈ Sub(ϕ,ψ), σ 6= ψ, REC(σ,M, ϕ) has a ﬁnite
element. Suppose now ψ is such.
Let ξ be a subformula of ϕ. If ∀yψ = ξ, or if ∃yψ = ξ and y is bounded in ψ, then
REC(ψ,M, ϕ) = REC(ξ,M, ϕ), which goes against the deﬁnition of ψ. However, as a
sentence ϕ must be quantiﬁed, so we can conclude ∃yψ = ψ∗ for some ψ∗ ∈ Sub(ϕ), where
y is free in ψ.
Now ϕ cannot be equivalent to a sentence of the form ∃x0, . . . ,∃xnψ since if it was
then every A ∈ REC(ψ,M, ϕ) would be ﬁnite. Instead ϕ equals to wψ for some sign
sequence w consisting of signs of the form ∀x and ∃x that bind variables in ψ. Let θ be
the formula obtained from wψ by removing all signs of the form ∀x from w. Then let
{p1, . . . , pn} ⊂ {1, . . . , n + k} and {m1, . . . ,mk} = {1, . . . , n + k} \ {p1, . . . , pn} be such
that θ = ∃xm1 . . . ∃xmkψ(xp1 , . . . , pn). (*)
Let now ESub(ϕ,ψ) = (φ1, . . . , φk), let fφi ∈ Skolem(φi,M) for each i ∈ {1, . . . , k}
and let B0 ∈ REC(∃xnψ,M, ϕ) be ﬁnite. Further, let and A0 := B0 × fφkB0. Then A0
is ﬁnite. Now (A0, ϕ, ψ, fφ1 , . . . , fφk) is inﬁnite and (A0, ϕ, ψ, fφ1 , . . . , fφk) =
⋃
i∈NAi for
a chain A0 ⊆ A1 ⊆ . . . ⊆Mn+k.
We deﬁne B(fφ1 , . . . , fφk) ⊆ (Mn+k)ω to consist of chains (bi)i∈N that satisfy the
following:
(1) b0 ∈ A0
(2) Suppose l ∈ N is such that Al \ {b0, . . . , bi} 6= ∅ but Aj \ {b0, . . . , bi} = ∅ for each
j < l. If bi = (b
1
i , . . . , b
n+k
i ) then bi+1 = (b
1
i+1, . . . , b
n+k
i+1 ), where
(2.a) bji+1 ∈ Col(Al) ∩
(
Col{bq : q ≤ i} ∪ Col({b0})
)
if j ∈ {p1, . . . , pn} and
(2.b) bji+1 = fφs(b
1
i+1, . . . , b
j−1
i+1 ) if j ∈ {m1, . . . ,mk} and ms = j (if j = 1 then
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ϕ is equivalent to a sentence of the form ∃xφ with x free in φ, so we may interpret
fφs(b
1
i+1, . . . , b
j−1
i+1 ) as some d ∈M such thatM |= φ(d)).
Claim 2. For each ﬁnite Aj , j ∈ N, and each (bi)i∈N ∈ B(fφ1 , . . . , fφk) ⊆ (Mn)ω,
there is m ∈ N such that
Aj ⊆ {bi : i ≤ m}.
We prove the claim by induction on l ∈ N. Suppose m ∈ N and let l ∈ N be the
smallest natural number such that Al \{b0, . . . , bm} 6= ∅ but Aj \{b0, . . . , bm} = ∅ for each
j < l. If Al is inﬁnite then the claim is clear, so we assume Al is ﬁnite. Since Ai ⊆ Ai+1
we may also assume l ≥ 2. We show by induction on j ∈ {1, . . . , n + k} that for any
a = (a1, . . . , an+k) ∈ Al there is q ∈ N such that bq = (b1q , . . . , bn+kq ) and bpq = ap for every
p ≤ j.
(a) j = 1: If ϕ is equivalent to a sentence of the form ∃xφ with x free in φ, then, as
was noted above, there is some s ∈ M such that a = d = b1i for any i ∈ N. Otherwise
aj1 ∈ Al−1 so by the ﬁniteness of Al−1, (2.a) of the of (bi)i∈N implies there is q ∈ N such
that b1q = a1.
(b) j = t+1: The induction assumption yiels that there is bq = (b
1
q , . . . , b
n+k
q ) such that
bpq = ap for all p ≤ t. Referring to the deﬁnition of notation at (*), if j ∈ {m1, . . . ,mk}
then clause (2.b) of the deﬁnition of (bi)i∈N applies, and so does the last written sentence
of the deﬁnition of a Skolem closure. By these two, j ∈ {m1, . . . ,mk} implies bjq =
fφs(b
1
q , . . . , b
t
q) = fφs(a1, . . . , at) = aj .
Suppose on the contrary that j ∈ {p1, . . . , pn}. Now Al \ {b0, . . . , bq} = ∅ would
complete this induction proof, so we assume Al\{b0, . . . , bq} 6= ∅. Then (2) of the deﬁnition
of (bi)i∈N yields ﬁrstly that
bjq ∈ Col(Al) ∩ Col({bp : p < q})
if j ∈ {p1, . . . , pn} and secondly, together with ﬁniteness of Al, that we may assume bjq = d
for any d ∈ Col(Al) ∩ Col{bp : p < q}(**). Furthermore, the induction assumption states
that for every c = (c1, . . . , cn+k) ∈ Al there is r ∈ N such that br = (b1r , . . . , bn+kr ) and bpr =
ap for any p ≤ t, so by the ﬁniteness of Al there is q∗ such that (Al)≤t ⊆ {b1, . . . , bq∗}≤t (see
the deﬁnition of projection for the deﬁnition of the notation ≤t). Now aj ∈ Col((Al)≤t),
and (2) of the deﬁnition of (bi)i∈N imply that we may assume q is large enough so that
aj ∈
(
Col{bp : p < q}
)
.
Combining this with (**) lets us assume bjq = aj . Hence b
p
q = ap for all p ≤ j. This com-
pletes the induction proving that for any j ∈ {1, . . . , n+k} and any a = (a1, . . . , an+k) ∈ Al
there is q ∈ N such that bq = (b1q , . . . , bn+kq ) and bpq = ap for every p ≤ j.
Therefore we have established that for every a ∈ Al there is i ∈ N such that a = bi.
Now the ﬁniteness of Al entails that there is m ∈ N such that Aj ⊆ {bi : i ≤ m}.  Claim
2.
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Claim 3. For each (bi)i∈N ∈ B(fφ1 , . . . , fφk) and each i ∈ N there is l ∈ N such that
bi ∈ Al.
Proof: It suﬃces to show that for every i ∈ N and every j ∈ {1, . . . , n + k} there
is l ∈ N and a ∈ Al such that bpi = ap for all p ≤ j, where bi = (b1i , . . . , bn+ki ) and
a = (a1, . . . , an+k). We prove this by induction on i ∈ N , j ∈ {1, . . . , n+ k}.
(a) i = 0, j ∈ {1, . . . , n+ k}: Directly by the deﬁnition of (bi)i∈N.
(b) i = q + 1, j ∈ {p1, . . . , pn}: Then bji+1 ∈ Col(Al) ∩ Col({bq : q < i}). The
induction assumption and the fact that A0 ⊆ A1 ⊆ . . . yield now that there is l ∈ N
such that {bq : q < i} ⊆ Al and bpq = ap for some a = (a1, . . . , an+k) ∈ Al+1 and every
q < i, p ≤ n + k. Therefore there is (a1, . . . , aj−1, cj , . . . , cn+k) ∈ Al+1 such that bpi = cp
for p ≤ j.
(c) i = m + 1, j ∈ {m1, . . . ,mk}: The induction assumption and the fact that A0 ⊆
A1 ⊆ . . . imply that there is l ∈ N such that {bq : q ≤ i} ⊆ Al and bpi = ap for some
a = (a1, . . . , an+k) ∈ Al+1 and every p ≤ j − 1. Therefore the deﬁnitions of (bi)i∈N and
Skolem closure yield that aj = fφs(a1, . . . , aj−1) = fφs(b1i , . . . , b
j−1
i ) = b
j
i for some ms = j.
 Claim 2.
Choose now (bi)i∈N ∈ B(fφ1 , . . . , fφk). We rename ψ(x1, . . . , xn+k) as σ(y, z) such
that y = (y1, . . . , yn) = (xi)i∈{p1,...,pn} and z = (z1, . . . , zk) = (xi)i∈{m1,...,mk}, and we
permutate each bi, i ∈ N, into (ai, di) such that ai = (a1i , . . . , ani ) = (bi)i∈{p1,...,pn} and
di = (d
1
i , . . . , d
k
i ) = (bi)i∈{m1,...,mk}. Based on claim 3, bi ∈ A for every i ∈ N and some
A ∈ REC(ψ,M, ϕ) so lemma 4.10 states thatM |= σ(ai, di) for every i ∈ N.
Further, let I ⊆ N be maximal such that 0 ∈ I and for any i ∈ I and any c ∈ {c ∈
Mk : σ(ai+1, c)
}
,
Col({c}) * Col({a0, . . . , ai}).
To ﬁnilize showing that σ and (ai, di)i∈I are as required, it suﬃces to prove the below:
Claim 4. I is inﬁnite.
Proof: As we observed before,
(B0 × fφkB0, ϕ, ψ, fφ1 , . . . , fφk) =
⋃
i∈N
Ai
for a chain
A0 ⊆ A1 ⊆ . . . ⊆Mn+k,
where each Ai+1 is constructed from Ai as in the deﬁnition of Skolem closures. Since
B0×fφkB0 is ﬁnite, so is each Ai, i ∈ N, based on the way they are constructed by ﬁnitary
functions in the said deﬁnition. Therefore we can deﬁne a chain (ci)iN such that for each
i ∈ N there are p, q ∈ N such that
Ai+1 \Ai = {cp, . . . , cq}.
Next permutate each ci, i ∈ N, into (si, ti) such that si = (s1i , . . . , sni ) = (ci)i∈{p1,...,pn} and
ti = (t
1
i , . . . , t
k
i ) = (ci)i∈{m1,...,mk}. Then we deﬁne J ⊆ N to be maximal such that 0 ∈ J
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and for any i ∈ J and any e ∈ {e ∈Mk : σ(si+1, e)},
Col({e}) * Col({s0, . . . , si}).
Now A0 is ﬁnite but, as noted earlier in the proof of this lemma, REC(ψ,M, ϕ) consists
of inﬁnite elements only so also
⋃
i∈NAi is inﬁnite.
Suppose J was ﬁnite. Considering that we have made no other assumptions on
fφ1 , . . . , fφk than that fφi ∈ Skolem(φi,M) for each i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, we can now assume
that
fφs(c
1
i+1, . . . , c
j−1
i+1 ) ⊆ Col
({s0, . . . , si})
for all j ∈ {m1, . . . ,mk} such that ms = j and for all i ∈ N except for i ∈ J . Then J
being ﬁnite,
fφs(c
1
i+1, . . . , c
j−1
i+1 ) ⊆ Col
({s0, . . . , smax(J)})
for all j ∈ {m1, . . . ,mk} such that ms = j and for all i ∈ N. Since on the other hand, by
the deﬁnition of Skolem closures,
{ci : i ∈ N} ⊆ {c0} ∪ Col
({
fφs(c
1
1, . . . , c
j−1
i ) : j ∈ {m1, . . . ,mk},ms = j, i ∈ N
})
,
also {ci : i ∈ N} =
⋃
i∈NAi becomes ﬁnite, which is a contradiction.
Therefore J is inﬁnite and this claim follows from claim 2.  Claim 4.
Theorem 4.12. A consistent L-sentence ϕ is true in inﬁnite models only, if and only if
there is an L-formula ψ(x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , yn) such that for all L-models M satisfying ϕ
there is (ai)i∈N, ai ∈Mn, such that for all i ∈ N,
(i) ψ(ai, ai+1)
(ii) ¬ψ(ai+1, aj) for j ≤ i.
Proof. If the conditions hold then ϕ is clearly true in inﬁnite models only. For the other
direction, let us assume ϕ is true in inﬁnite models only. Then lemma 4.11 yields that
there is an L-formula σ(x′1, . . . , x′m, y′1, . . . , y′k) such that for all L-modelsM satisfying ϕ
there is (bi, ci)i∈N, bi ∈Mm, ci ∈Mk, such that for all i ∈ N,
(a) σ(bi, ci)
(b) for any d ∈ {d ∈Mk : σ(bi+1, d)},
Col({d}) * Col({b0, . . . , bi}).
Deﬁne now x = (x1, . . . , xn) = (x
′
1, . . . , x
′
m, z1, . . . , zk), y = (y1, . . . , yn) = (z
∗
1 , . . . , z
∗
m, y
′
1, . . . , y
′
k)
and
ψ(x, y) := σ(x′1, . . . , x
′
m, y
′
1, . . . , y
′
k) ∧
∧
i∈{1,...,k}
zi = zi ∧
∧
i∈{1,...,m}
z∗i = z
∗
i .
Further, let (ai)i∈N be such that for each i ∈ N, ai = (bi+1, ci). Then ψ and (ai)i∈N are
clearly as required.
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4.2 Island models
In this section we construct a class of models that have the property of consisting of
ﬁnite equivalence classes, "islands", such that elements in distinct islands have a limited
number of possible relationships to one another. We prove that all these "Island models"
are pseudo-ﬁnite.
Lemma 4.13. LetM be an L-model and let P ∈ L be a binary relation symbol such that
P := (P )M forms an equivalence relation in M .
Suppose that for all L-atomic formulas ψ(x0, . . . , xn) and for all 0 ≤ n′ < n there are
ﬁnite sets of L-formulas {σ0, . . . , σs} and {τ0, . . . , τt}, such that
(a) the free variable symbols of σ0, . . . , σs are within {x0, . . . , xn′} and the ones of
{τ0, . . . , τt} within {xn′+1, . . . , xn}
(b) if a¯ ∈ Mn′+1 and b¯ ∈ Mn−n′ (from now on, we notate a¯, b¯ ∈ M), then there are
l ∈ {0, . . . , s} and k ∈ {0, . . . , t} such thatM |= σl(a¯) ∧ τk(b¯) (we'll notate σl(a¯) ∧ τk(b¯))
(c) if l ∈ {0, . . . , s} and k ∈ {0, . . . , t}, then ψ(a¯, b¯) either for all or for no a¯, b¯ ∈ M
such that
σl(a¯) ∧ τk(b¯) ∧
∧
i∈{0,...,n′}
j∈{0,...,n∗}
¬P (ai, bj)
(let us notate from here on that
P (a¯, b¯) :=
∧
i∈{0,...,n′}
j∈{0,...,n∗}
P (ai, bj).
Then for all L-formulas ϕ there are corresponding sets of formulas {σϕ0 , . . . , σϕs} and
{τϕ0 , . . . , τϕt} satisfying conditions (1) - (3).
Proof. By induction on structure of the formula ϕ(x0, . . . , xn).
1◦ ϕ is atomic: Directly by assumption.
2◦ ϕ = ¬ψ: If {σψ0 , . . . , σψs} and {τψ0 , . . . , τψt} satisfy (a)-(c) for ψ, then also ϕ sat-
isﬁes them.
3◦ ϕ = ψ ∧ φ: Formulas σψk ∧ σφl and τψm ∧ τφp , k ∈ {0, . . . , sψ}, l ∈ {0, . . . , sφ},
m ∈ {0, . . . , tψ}, p ∈ {0, . . . , tφ} clearly satisfy (a) ja (b), as by induction asumption we
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may assume that formulas σψk ja σφl display the same free variables, and that so do also
τψm ja τφp . Condition (c): Let a¯, b¯, c¯, d¯ ∈M be such that
¬P (a¯, b¯)) ∧ (σψk ∧ σφl)(a¯) ∧ (τψm ∧ τφp)(b¯)
and
¬P (c¯, d¯)) ∧ (σψk ∧ σφl)(c¯) ∧ (τψm ∧ τφp)(d¯).
Now
¬P (a¯, b¯)) ∧ [σψk(a¯) ∧ τψm(b¯)] ∧ [σφl(a¯) ∧ τφp(b¯)]
and
¬P (c¯, d¯)) ∧ [σψk(c¯) ∧ τψm(d¯)] ∧ [σφl(c¯) ∧ τφp(d¯)],
so
ϕ(a¯, b¯) joss ψ(a¯, b¯) ∧ φ(a¯, b¯) joss ψ(c¯, d¯) ∧ φ(c¯, d¯) joss ϕ(c¯, d¯).
4◦ ϕ = ∀xpψ: Due to symmetry we may assume that xp is free in ψ and that x0, . . . , xn
are free in ϕ. Let a¯ ∈ Mn′+1 and b¯ ∈ Mn−n′ . Induction assumption oﬀers now σ-
and τ -formulas satisfying (a)-(c) ψ with any distribution of variables between the σ- and
τ -formulas. Suppose that formulas {σ1ψ0 , . . . , σ1ψs1} and {τ
1
ψ0
, . . . , τ1ψt1
} satisfy the con-
ditions by a distribution in which xp appears in the σ-formulas. Let us then notate
that σ1ψj = σ
1
ψj
(x¯a, xp) and τ
1
ψj
= τ1ψj (x¯b, xp). Respectively suppose that {σ2ψ0 , . . . , σ2ψs2}
and{τ2ψ0 , . . . , τ2ψt2} fulﬁll the conditions on distrubution in which xp is a σ-variable. Let us
then notate σ1ψj = σ
1
ψj
(x¯a, xp) and τ
2
ψj
= τ2ψj (x¯b, xp). In either case we say that σ
1
ψj
∧τ1ψk or
σ2ψj ∧τ2ψk is a positive combination, if ψ(a¯, b¯, c) when σ1ψj (a¯, c)∧τ1ψk(b¯) or σ2ψj (a¯)∧τ2ψk(b¯, c).
Let us next deﬁne some formulas and notations. Let a¯ ∈ Mn′+1 and b¯ ∈ Mn−n′ and
la¯,b¯ ∈ {0, . . . , s2} as well as ka¯,b¯ ∈ {0, . . . , t1} be such that σ2ψla¯,b¯ (a¯) ∧ τ
1
ψka¯,b¯
(b¯).
Aa¯,b¯ = {i ∈ {0, . . . , s1}
∣∣∃xp(P (a¯, xp) ∧ σ1ψi(a¯, xp))}
Ba¯,b¯ = {j ∈ {0, . . . , t2}
∣∣∃xp(P (b¯, xp) ∧ τ2ψj (b¯, xp))}
Ca¯,b¯ = {i ∈ {0, . . . , s1}
∣∣∃xpσ1ψi(a¯, xp)}
Da¯,b¯ = {j ∈ {0, . . . , t2}
∣∣∃xpτ2ψj (b¯, xp)}
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Σa¯,b¯(x¯a, x¯b) =
∧
j∈Aa¯,b¯
∃xp
(
P (x¯a, xp) ∧ σ1ψi(x¯a, xp)
)
∧
∧
j∈Ba¯,b¯
∃xp
(
P (x¯b, xp) ∧ τ2ψj (x¯b, xp)
)
∧σ2ψla¯,b¯ (x¯a) ∧ τ
1
ψka¯,b¯
(x¯b)
∧∀xp
(
(
∨
i∈Ca¯,b¯
σ1ψi(x¯a, xp)) ∧ (
∨
j∈Da¯,b¯
τ2ψj (x¯b, xp))
)
{Σt¯,u¯ : t¯, u¯ ∈M} = {Σk : k ∈ U}
I, J ⊆ U
σψI = (
∧
l∈I
∃x¯bΣl(x¯a, x¯b)) ∧
∧
l∈U\I
¬∃x¯bΣl(x¯a, x¯b)
τψJ = (
∧
k∈J
∃x¯aΣk(x¯a, x¯b)) ∧
∧
k∈U\J
¬∃x¯aΣk(x¯a, x¯b).
Let us show that deﬁned as above, there is a ﬁnite amount of formulas σψI ja τψJ , and
that they realize (a)-(c) for ϕ.
Finiteness: This depends on the size of the set {Σk : k ∈ U} = {Σt¯,u¯ : t¯, u¯ ∈ M}. For
each t¯, u¯ ∈M the formula Σt¯,u¯ consists of predicate P , variables x¯a and x¯b, and of ﬁnitely
many σ- ja τ - formulas for ψ, as well as of sets A, B, C ja D that are subsets of {0, . . . , s1}
and {0, . . . , t1}. Thus there can be only a ﬁnite amount of formulas Σt¯,u¯, which means
there is only a ﬁnite amount of formulas σψI ja τψJ .
(a): Clear, since the only free variable symbols in Σt¯,u¯, t¯, u¯ ∈M are
x¯a, x¯b = (x0, . . . , xn′), (xn′+1, . . . , xn).
(b): Let t¯, u¯ ∈ M . According to the induction assumption there is l ∈ {0, . . . , s2} ja
k ∈ {0, . . . , t1} such that σ2ψl(t¯) ∧ τ1ψk(u¯), in addition to which the induction assumtion
provides r ∈M with some i ∈ {0, . . . , s1} ja j ∈ {0, . . . , t2} such that σ1ψi(t¯, r) ∧ τ2ψj (u¯, r).
Thus at least Σt¯,u¯(t¯, u¯) implying that Σk(t¯, u¯) for some k ∈ U . Therefore there are non-
empty I, J ⊂ U such that σψI (t¯) ∧ τψJ (u¯).
(c): Let c¯, d¯, t¯, u¯ ∈ M , ¬P (c¯, d¯), ¬P (t¯, u¯), I, J ⊆ U , σψI (t¯) ∧ τψJ (u¯), σψI (c¯) ∧ τψJ (d¯)
and ϕ(t¯, u¯). Let us show that ϕ(c¯, d¯).
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According to condition (b) there is k ∈ U such that Σk(t¯, u¯). Now must be k ∈ I ∪ J ,
so there is q¯ ∈Mn′+1 and r¯ ∈Mn−n′ such that Σk(c¯, r¯) ja Σk(q¯, d¯). If now
Σk(x¯a, x¯b) =
∧
j∈A
∃xp
(
P (x¯a, xp) ∧ σ1ψi(x¯a, xp)
)
∧
∧
j∈B
∃xp
(
P (x¯b, xp) ∧ τ2ψj (x¯b, xp)
)
σ2ψl(x¯a) ∧ τ1ψk(x¯b) ∧ ∀xp
(
(
∨
i∈C
σ1ψi(x¯a, xp)) ∧ (
∨
j∈D
τ2ψj (x¯b, xp))
)
=: φ(x¯a) ∧ η(x¯b) ∧ σ2ψl(x¯a) ∧ τ1ψk(x¯b) ∧ ∀xpθ(x¯a, x¯b),
then
φ(c¯) ∧ η(r¯) ∧ σ2ψl(c¯) ∧ τ1ψk(r¯)
∧∀xp
(
(
∨
i∈C
σ1ψi(c¯, xp)) ∧ (
∨
j∈D
τ2ψj (r¯, xp))
)
and
φ(q¯) ∧ η(d¯) ∧ σ2ψl(q¯) ∧ τ1ψk(d¯)
∧∀xp
(
(
∨
i∈C
σ1ψi(q¯, xp)) ∧ (
∨
j∈D
τ2ψj (d¯, xp))
)
.
Now for every h ∈M there is i ∈ C and j ∈ D such that σ1ψi(c¯, h) and τ2ψj (d¯, h), so we
obtain
φ(c¯) ∧ η(d¯) ∧ σ2ψl(c¯) ∧ τ1ψk(d¯)
∀xp
(
(
∨
i∈C
σ1ψi(c¯, xp)) ∧ (
∨
j∈D
τ2ψj (d¯, xp))
)
that is equivalent to Σk(c¯, d¯).
Because Σk(t¯, u¯), we have∧
j∈A
∃xp
(
P (t¯, xp) ∧ σ1ψi(t¯, xp)
)
∧
∧
j∈B
∃xp
(
P (u¯, xp) ∧ τ2ψj (u¯, xp)
)
σ2ψl(t¯) ∧ τ1ψk(u¯) ∧ ∀xp
(
(
∨
i∈C
σ1ψi(t¯, xp)) ∧ (
∨
j∈D
τ2ψj (u¯, xp))
)
.
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If h ∈M then there is i ∈ C ja j ∈ D, such that σ1ψi(t¯, h)∧τ1ψk(u¯) and σ2ψl(t¯)∧τ2ψj (u¯, h).
Let now a¯, b¯ ∈M be such that Σk = Σa¯,b¯. Then there are three option:
i) ¬P (h, a¯) ∧ ¬P (h, b¯): Now σ2ψl(a¯) ∧ τ1ψk(b¯) and for some n ∈ Ca¯,b¯, m ∈ Da¯,b¯ holds
σ1ψn(t¯, h)∧ τ2ψm(u¯, h). In addition ¬P (h, t¯) or ¬P (h, u¯) and ψ(t¯, h, u¯), so at least σ1ψn ∧ τ1ψk
tai σ2ψl ∧ τ2ψm is a positive combination. Now both ¬P (h, a¯) and ¬P (h, b¯), so ψ(a¯, h, b¯).
ii) P (h, a¯): Now τ1ψk(b¯), τ
1
ψk
(u¯), for some i′ ∈ Aa¯,b¯ holds σ1ψi′ (a¯, h), and there is h
′ ∈M ,
P (h′, t¯) such that σ1ψi′ (t¯, h
′). Then ¬P (h′, u¯) ja ψ(t¯, h′, u¯), so σ1ψi′ ∧ τ
1
ψk
is a positive com-
bination; since ¬P (h, b¯), then also ψ(a¯, h, b¯).
iii) P (h, b¯): By symmetry we can see that ψ(a¯, h, b¯) the same way as in ii).
Thus we see that all the σ1ψi ∧ τ1ψj and σ2ψi ∧ τ2ψj - combinations appearing in Σa¯,b¯ are
positive. Since Σk(c¯, d¯), we obtain
σ2ψl(c¯) ∧ τ1ψk(d¯) ∧ ∀xp
(
(
∨
i∈C
σ1ψi(c¯, xp)) ∧ (
∨
j∈D
τ2ψj (d¯, xp))
)
,
meaning that for every h ∈ M there is i ∈ C and j ∈ D such that σ1ψi(c¯, h) ∧ τ1ψk(d¯)
and σ2ψl(c¯) ∧ τ2ψj (d¯, h). Now either ¬P (h, c¯) or ¬P (h, d¯), so ψ(c¯, h, d¯) for every h ∈ M , so
we obtain ϕ(c¯, d¯). Therefore by symmetry, ϕ(c¯, d¯) if and only if ϕ(t¯, u¯).
Deﬁnition 4.14. Let L be an alphabet that includes an inﬁnite number of function sym-
bols, let P /∈ L a new binary relation symbol and letM be an L-model. We say thatM is
an island model, if there is an L ∪ {P}-modelM∗ satisfying the assumptions of lemma
4.13 such thatM∗  L =M and every ﬁnite set of equivalence relations of PM∗ combined
with interpretations induced byM∗ is a ﬁnite submodel ofM∗. We call such an N ⊆M∗
fulﬁlling these conditions an island submodel of M∗ and we notate N ⊂island M∗. Fur-
thermore, if N ⊂island H ja H ⊂islandM∗, we notate N ⊂islandM.
Theorem 4.15. LetM be an L-island model and let L andM∗ be as in deﬁnition 4.14.
Then for all such L-formulas ϕ thatM∗ |= ϕ there is N ⊂islandM∗, such that if N ⊂island
H ⊂islandM∗, then H |= ϕ. EspeciallyM∗, and thus alsoM, are pseudo-ﬁnite.
Proof. Based on lemma 4.13, it suﬃces to prove the claim for L-formulas in the quantiﬁers-
ﬁrst-form. We use induction on the structure of an L-formula in the said form.
Let us form the induction assumption as follows: For each formula ψ(x0, . . . , xn) and
interpretation function s of modelM∗ there is Nψ,s ⊂islandM∗ such that if Nψ,a¯ ⊂island
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K ⊂islandM∗, a0, . . . , an ∈ M∗ andM∗ |= ψ(a0, . . . , an), then H |= ψ(a0, . . . , an), where
H ⊂islandM∗ and
H = dom(H) = dom(K) ∪ {b ∈M∗ : P (b, ai) for all i ∈ {0, . . . , n}}.
1◦ ϕ(x0, . . . , xn) is unquantiﬁed: Let s be an interpretation function inM∗, let a0, . . . , an ∈
M∗, letM∗ |= ϕ(a0, . . . , an), and let
Nϕ,s = {b ∈M∗
∣∣P (b, s(t)), t is a term displaying in formula ϕ},
Nϕ,s ⊂island K ⊂islandM∗ and
H = K ∪ {b ∈M∗∣∣P (b, ai) for every i ∈ {0, . . . , n}}.
Then H |= ϕ(a0, . . . , an) since H ⊆M∗ by the island model's deﬁnition.
2◦ ϕ = ∃xpψ: According to lemma 4.13 there are formulas {σn′φ0 , . . . , σn
′
φs
} ja {τn′φ0 , . . . , τn
′
φt
}
that satisfy the lemma's assumptions for modelM∗, for all L-formulas φ(x0, . . . , xn) and
for all the ways of distributing the n + 1 variable symbols of ψ between the σ and τ for-
mulas. Let us name sequences a¯n
′
φl
∈ (M∗)n′+1 and b¯n′φk ∈ (M∗)n−n
′
for each σn
′
φl
ja τn
′
φk
,
such that σφl(a¯
n′
φl
) and τφk(b¯
n′
τφl
), assuming that such exist. Let An
′
φ and B
n′
φ be the ﬁnite
sets of these (ﬁnite) sequences.
If xp is not free in ψ then ` ψ ↔ ϕ, which means the induction assumption holds triv-
ially. Hence we may assume that ψ = ψ(x0, . . . , xn, xp) and p > n. Let then {σnψ0 , . . . , σnψs}
and {τnψ0 , . . . , τnψt} be formulas realizing lemma 4.13 for ψ such that only xp appears in the
τ -formulas.
Let now s be an interpretation function inM∗, let a¯ = a0, . . . , an ∈M∗ and e ∈M∗ be
such thatM∗ |= ψ(a¯, e). Then based on lemma 4.13, either P (ai, e) for all i ∈ {0, . . . , n}
or there is d ∈ Bn′ψ such that ψ(a¯, d) (*).
Let us therefore study Nϕ,s ⊂islandM∗, the domain of which is
Nψ,s ∪ {c ∈M∗
∣∣P (c, d) for some d ∈ Bn′ψ },
where Nψ,s = dom(Nψ,s) and Nψ,s is the island submodel ofM∗ satisfying the induction
assumption for the formula ψ and the interpretation function s.
Let now Nϕ,s ⊂island K ⊂island M∗ and let H ⊂island M∗ be obtained from model K
by adding to dom(K) the following set
{b ∈M∗ : P (b, ai) for every i ∈ {0, . . . , n}}.
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Suppose then M∗ |= ϕ(a¯). Now there is c ∈ M∗ such that M∗ |= ψ(a¯, c), so by (*),
M∗ |= ψ(a¯, c) for some c ∈ M∗ such that either c ∈ Bn′ψ , or P (a¯, c) (meaning P (ai, c) for
all i ∈ {0, . . . , n}); in any case c ∈ H. Hence the induction assmption implies H |= ψ(a¯, c)
for some c ∈ H, and so H |= ϕ(a¯). Therefore Nϕ,s satisﬁes the induction claim.
3◦ ϕ = ∀xpψ: Let ϕ = ϕ(x0, . . . , xn) and suppose a¯ ∈ (M∗)n is such thatM∗ |= ϕ(a¯).
Further, let Nψ,s ⊂island K ⊂island M∗, K = dom(K) and e ∈ K ∪ {b ∈ M∗
∣∣P (a¯, b)}.
Then M∗ |= ψ(a¯, e), so according to the induction assumption: If H ⊂island M∗ is such
that
H = K ∪ {b ∈M∗∣∣P (a¯, e; b)},
then H |= ψ(a¯, e). Now either e ∈ K or e ∈ {b ∈M∗∣∣P (a¯, b)}. In the former case H = K
and in the latter, H = K ∪ {b ∈ M∗∣∣P (a¯, b)}. However, deﬁning K′ and H′ otherwise
as K and H were but with the diﬀerence that K ′ = K ∪ {b ∈ M∗∣∣P (a¯, b)}, implies that
H ′ = K ′ ∪ {b ∈ M∗∣∣P (a¯, b)} in any case but, by the induction assumption, H′ |= ψ(a¯, e)
still. Note that H′ is the same undepending on the e ∈ K ∪{b ∈M∗∣∣P (a¯, b)} = H ′ chosen
and H′ |= ψ(a¯, e) at any rate. Thus deﬁne
Nϕ,s = Nψ,s
and let Nϕ,s ⊂island K∗ ⊂islandM∗ and H∗ ⊂islandM∗ where
H∗ = K∗ ∪ {b ∈M∗∣∣P (a¯, b)}.
Now H∗ = H′ so H∗ |= ψ(a¯, e) for any e ∈ H∗. Thus H∗ |= ϕ(a¯), so Nϕ,s is as required.
Remark 4.16. The theorem does not genralize to the form that it suﬃces for the islands,
the equivalence classes of relation P , to be pseudo-ﬁnite. We develop a counter example
below.
Example 4.17. There is a non-pseudoﬁnite model that otherwise fulﬁlls the deﬁnition of
an island model but has an inﬁnite, yet pseudoﬁnite, "island".
Proof. Let V be pseudo-ﬁnite {R, V }-model, where V is an unary relation symbol such
that V V = V . Then let b /∈ V and letW be another {R, V }-model such that W = V ∪{b}
and W  V = V. Suppose R is a trinary relation symbol and V = {ai : i ∈ N}. Let
W |= R(ai, b, aj) and let W |= R(ai, aj , b) and W |= R(b, ai, aj) be true precisely when
i ≤ j, and let R(a, b, b) be R(b, b, a) false in W for all a ∈ W . Then the following is true
in W:
∃v
(
∀x∀y∀z
((
x 6= v → R(x, v, x)) ∧ (R(x, v, y) ∧R(y, v, z)→ R(x, v, z)))
∧∃x0
(
∀x1
(
R(x0, v, x1)→ ∃y
(
R(x1, v, y) ∧ ∀z
(
R(y, v, z)→ ¬R(z, v, x1)
)))))
.
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Now W is not pseudoﬁnite, but every {R, V }-atomic formula, i.e. formulas of the form
x = y or R(x, y, z), satisfy the contidions of lemma 4.13, as we can expand model W
{R, V, P} to W∗ by adding an island separating equivalence relation PW∗ := {(x, y) ∈
W 2 : x, y ∈ V or x = y = v}, and deﬁne the σ- and τ -formulas for R(x, y, z) as follows
(due to symmetry we may assume that x and y are σ-variables and z is a τ -variable):
τ0 = ¬V (z)
τ1 = V (z)
σ0 = V (x) ∧ V (y) ∧ ∀z(¬V (z)→ R(x, y, z))
σ1 = V (x) ∧ V (y) ∧ ∀z(¬V (z)→ ¬R(x, y, z))
σ2 = ¬V (y) ∨ ¬V (x).
Now for all t, u, w ∈ W there are i and j such that σi(t, u) ∧ τj(w), and if P (t, u) ja
¬P (u,w), then either
(1) V (t)∧ V (u) in which case τ0(w) and σ0(t, u) (implying R(t, u, w)) or σ1(t, u), (im-
plying ¬R(t, u, w))
or
(2) ¬V (t)∨¬V (u), in which case σ2(t, u) and τ1(w), implying ¬R(t, u, w); τ0(w) is not
possible now since ¬P (t, w) ∧ ¬P (u,w).
Thus W otherwise satisﬁes the deﬁnition of an island model except that it has an in-
ﬁnite "island" (meaning an equivalence class of P ). However, W is not pseudo-ﬁnite.
Example 4.18. A model with empty alphabet.
Let M = (M). Then M∗ = (M ;P ) satisﬁes the conditions in lemma 4.13, when P
is a binary relation symbol, PM∗(a, b) iﬀ a = b and σx0=x1 = τx0=x1 = ∀x0(x0 = x0).
In addtion M is an island model because M∗ fulﬁlls deﬁnition 4.14. Thus theorem 4.15
yieldsM pseudo-ﬁnite.
Example 4.19. Suppose Ai, i ∈ I, are models of empty alphabet and B = (
⋃
i∈I Ai;Pi :
i ∈ I), where Pi : i ∈ I are binary relation symbols such that Pi(a, b) iﬀ a, b ∈ Ai for
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each i ∈ I. Suppose R is an extra binary relation symbol and {R,Pi : i ∈ I}-model
B∗ an expansion of model B, such that B∗  (Pi : i ∈ I) = B and RB∗(a, b) iﬀ a = b.
Then B realizes the conditions of an island model and is therefore pseudoﬁnite, which
we see by deﬁning the equivalence classes and formulas required by the following way:
P = R, σx0=x1 = τx0=x1 = ∀x0(x0 = x0), σPi,0 = ∃x1Pi(x0, x1), τPi,0 = ∃x0Pi(x0, x1),
σPi,1 = ¬∃x1Pi(x0, x1) and τPi,1 = ¬∃x0Pi(x0, x1).
Example 4.20. Suppose {P ji : i ∈ I}-model Bj is like B of the previous example, for each
j ∈ J , and suppose C = (⋃j∈J Bj ;P ′j : j ∈ J), where P ′j : j ∈ J are binary relation symbols
such that P ′j(a, b) iﬀ a, b ∈ Bj for each j ∈ J . Then model C can be found pseudo-ﬁnite by
a respective technique as with B in the previous example.
Example 4.21. "Island version" of the standard model of number theory
Let us deﬁne
N =
( ⋃
i∈N
Zi; +,×,0i,1i : i ∈ N
)
as follows: for each i ∈ N, the set of of coungruence classes, Zi+1 = {0i, . . . , ii},
0Ni = 0i, 1
N
i = 1i, and the function symbols + ja −, are interpret as normal within the
congruence classes, but if n,m ≤ i and j < i, then ni + mj = ni ×mj = 00. Now N is
an island model, when we interpret PN (ni,mj) iﬀ i = j, since for all i 6= j, ni +mj = pk
and ni ×mj = pk hold exactly if pk = 00, and for instance, ni + pk = mj holds precisely
if mj = 00.
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